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with a special emphasis on terrorism risk. Our motivation to implement research in this particularly
challenging area of risk management is due to the increasing magnitude of operational losses over the
last decade and their negative effect on financial industry. This thesis contributes to the existing research
on operational risk in several ways. First, our research suggests a model that addresses the issue of
dependence between operational losses and how it can be accounted for in the value of capital charge
for operational risk. Second, we provide a better understanding of the impact of a particular type of
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catastrophic and can have negative consequences on the behavior of financial markets. We implement
empirical analysis of the impact of terrorist attacks on stock, bond and commodity markets and suggest
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Introduction
The objective of this thesis is to consider different risk management issues in relation to
operational risk with a special emphasis on terrorism risk. Our motivation to implement
research in this particularly challenging area of risk management is due to the increasing
frequency and magnitude of operational losses over the last decade and their negative effect
on financial industry1. This thesis contributes to the existing research on operational
risk in several ways. First, our research suggests a model that addresses the issue of
dependence between operational losses and how it can be accounted for in the value of
capital charge for operational risk. Second, we provide a better understanding of the
impact of a particular type of operational risk event, specifically of terrorist attacks.
As evidenced by the 9/11 attacks, this risk can be catastrophic and can have negative
consequences on the behavior of financial markets. We implement empirical analysis
of the impact of terrorist attacks on stock, bond and commodity markets and suggest
possible diversification strategies of terrorism risk. Finally, we contribute to the area of
operational risk transfer, by developing a model for pricing of a multiple-event coupon
paying CAT bond. The bond that we consider covers exposure to catastrophic risk such
as natural and man-made disasters, including terrorist events.
Market and credit risks have been the subject of much debate and research in the fi-
nancial industry during the 1990s. Since then financial institutions have made significant
1Rising levels of exposure to operational risk are driven by deregulation, globalization, and advances in tech-
nology, that in turn, have led to the creation of new and highly sophisticated production processes and complex
products. For example, the development of hedging and risk mitigation techniques have enabled financial insti-
tutions to better manage the market and credit risks arising from complex products but, in turn, have created
additional operational risk exposures. Another example, the growth of e-banking and e-commerce that exposes
institutions to such type of operational risk as fraud. The upward trend in operational loss frequencies and
severities is described in papers by Cummins, Lewis, and Wei (2006) and Fontnouvelle, De Jesus-Rueff, Jordan,
and Rosengren (2006). Finally, terrorist attacks have brought increased attention to operational losses. The
magnitude and frequency of these operational risk events have been increasing since 1982 (OECD (2005)).
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progress in the identification, measurement and management of both types of risk. How-
ever, experience of events such as the 1995 bankruptcy of Barings Bank due to fraudulent
trading (Brown and Steenbeek (2001)), the losses in financial industry due to the 9/11
attacks (Johnston and Nedelescu (2005)) and losses due to data input error in Mizuho
Financial Group in 2005 (Katsumura and Obayashi (2005)) highlights the fact that risk
management should go beyond market and credit risks only. We are referring to opera-
tional risk: the risk of an institution experiencing losses due to an internal system failure
or due to external events, such as terrorist attacks and natural disasters. Initially, this risk
was defined as any form of risk that is not market or credit risk. However, this definition is
rather vague and does not tell us about the exact types of operational risk faced by finan-
cial institutions. A better definition is provided by the regulators, who define operational
risk as “...the risk of direct or indirect loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal
processes, people and systems or from external events” (BIS (2006)). This definition in-
cludes legal risk, but excludes strategic and reputational risk. Together with researchers
and risk managers at major banks, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has de-
veloped a risk management framework for operational risk that includes qualitative and
quantitative techniques to assess potential exposure to this risk as well as approaches
to compute a capital charge against operational losses (BIS (2003a), BIS (2003b) BIS
(2005), BIS (2006)). In addition, the literature on the conceptual issues and quantitative
methodologies in relation to this risk both by scientific researchers and practitioners has
been developing (see Frachot, O.Moudoulaud, and T.Roncalli (2003), Fontnouvelle and
E.Rosengren (2004), Moscadelli (2004), Fontnouvelle, V.DeJesus-Rueff, J.Jordan, and
E.Rosengren (2003), Alvarez (2001), Embrechts, C.Kluppelberg, and T.Mikosch (1997),
McNeil and Saladin (1997) and McNeil (1999)). In this thesis we contribute to this re-
search area by looking at different aspects of operational risk management.
First, we suggest a model that addresses the issue of dependence between operational
losses and how it can be accounted for in the value of capital at risk (CaR) associated
with operational risk. In contrast to the Loss Distribution Approach (LDA) described
by regulators in Basel II, our model accounts for the underlying dependence between
aggregate losses of different classes of risk. For the first time in this research area, we
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model this dependence, assuming that it is driven by both, dependence between loss
frequencies and dependence between loss severities. The model implementation shows
that values of capital at risk obtained based on the loss distribution approach are higher
than values obtained using the suggested approach. In addition, we demonstrate results
of the numerical evaluation when instead of the VaR, a coherent and more conservative
risk measure is used to compute a capital charge, namely the expected shortfall (ES).
This measure reflects a possible exposure to a loss that exceeds VaR. Given possibility of
rare but high magnitude operational risk ‘tail events’, the ES is more reliable than VaR.
The findings of the model reveal that accounting for operational loss dependence in the
value of capital at risk improves its accuracy. This is important for banks and regulators
because for banks, the capital charge should reflect their true operational risk exposure.
For regulators, the capital charge that is correctly computed across all banks would help
to preserve stability in the banking and financial sectors of the economy.
Second, we implement empirical analysis of the impact of operational risk events such
as terrorist attacks on the behavior of different financial markets. The impact on financial
markets of the 9/11 terrorist attacks as well as those of more recent attacks in Madrid in
2004 and London in 2005 reveals that terrorism risk is a new type of operational risk that
can be catastrophic and that investors and financial institutions are likely to face in the
future.
In our study, we consider terrorist events that took place in 25 countries over an 11 year
time period and implement our analysis using different methods: an event-study approach,
non-parametric methodology, and a filtered GARCH-EVT approach. The results of this
study show that although financial markets perceive terrorist events as unusual, they
do not see their effects as long-lasting. The results of empirical analysis suggest several
diversification strategies for investors who may be concerned about possible adverse effects
of terrorism risk on their portfolios. When dealing with terrorism risk, investors should
hold assets that are likely to react positively to terrorist attacks or, those that have
little or no negative sensitivity to this risk. The first type of asset may be represented
by a U.S. Government bond index followed by such industry stocks as aero/defense and
pharma/biotech. The second type of assets may include a banking stock index (unless
5
an event similar to the 9/11 attacks occurs in the heart of financial industry). Note
that, though this stock index is least sensitive to terrorist attacks, it exhibits significant
negative return movements associated with financial crashes. To reduce negative exposure
to terrorist events investors should avoid investing in insurance, travel and airline industry
stocks. As to commodities, investing in a composite commodity index is preferable to
investing in gold only.
The response of financial markets to terrorist events suggests several strategies of
trading derivatives. For example, investors can hold long positions in put options on
industry stocks that react negatively to terrorist events (for example, airline and insurance
industry stocks). Or alternatively, they can invest in call options, where the underlying
asset is a U.S. Government bond index.
Finally, we find both similarities and differences between the impact of terrorist events
on financial markets and the effect of financial crashes and natural disasters. Note that the
recent history of natural disasters and terrorist events reveals a changing nature of these
catastrophic events both in terms of their frequency and their magnitude. The anticipated
increase of severe storms and weather events associated with climate change and on-going
threat of terrorist events can place enormous financial demands on the insurance and
reinsurance businesses (Fishel (2005)). As a result, development of the ways to transfer
these operational/catastrophic risks to capital markets has become more important than
ever before. The final contribution of our thesis addresses this very issue. We develop a
framework for pricing of a multiple-event coupon paying CAT bond. The model is the
first of its kind to address theoretical issues of pricing of an insurance-linked security that
derives its value based on two underlying processes: catastrophic insured property losses
and catastrophic mortality. It is also the first study that develops a CAT bond with
a multiple-event and multi-risk structure. In addition, this work provides a numerical
evaluation of the bond’s price using the UK catastrophic data provided by Swiss Re. The
results of this study indicate that the price of the bond increases with attachment levels
and decreases with stronger positive dependence between property losses and deaths. Our
research finds presence of an inverse relationship between the price of the bond and its
time to expiration. Although this relationship always works for a zero-coupon catastrophe
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bond, it may not always hold for those cases where the bond pays coupons. We find a less
responsive behavior of the bond’s price to changes in dependence compared to changes in
the time to maturity. Overall, the model suggested in this paper may be interesting to
insurance and reinsurance companies and other financial institutions that want to transfer
their exposure to catastrophic risks, including risk of terrorism, to capital markets. With
respect to the latter risk, our model allows to protect from losses and deaths that are of
significantly lower magnitude than what current terrorism related risk transfer securities
allow.
In summary, the thesis consists of three papers that focus on different aspects of oper-
ational risk management. Paper 1 addresses the issue of dependence between operational
losses and how it can be accounted for in the value of capital at risk of a bank. Paper
2 describes empirical analysis of the impact of terrorism as a particular type of oper-
ational risk on the behavior of stock, bond and commodity markets. This paper is a
joint work with Prof. Dr. Marc Chesney. Paper 3 presents a framework for pricing of
a multiple-event coupon paying catastrophe risk bond. This type of a bond represents
one of the ways to transfer to capital markets operational risk related to terrorism and
natural catastrophes.
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Paper 1
Dependence of Operational Losses
and the Capital at Risk
1.1 Introduction
Since the time of famous Barings fraudulent trading in 1995 (Bhugaloo (2005)), opera-
tional risk has become an area of growing concern in banking. The magnitude of opera-
tional losses over the last decade and their negative effect on banks’ financial position and
reputation explains increasing attention to the management of operational risk. The New
Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
calls for an explicit treatment of operational risk and asks banks to set a capital charge
against operational losses (BIS (2003a), BIS (2003b) BIS (2005), BIS (2006)). This paper
addresses the issue of dependence of operational losses and how it can be accounted for in
the value of capital at risk (CaR) of a bank. In contrast to the Loss Distribution Approach
(LDA) described by regulators in Basel II, our model accounts for underlying dependence
between aggregate losses of different classes of risk. For the first time in this research
area, we model this dependence, assuming that it is driven by both dependence between
loss frequencies and dependence between loss severities. To consider the latter type of
dependence is as important as to consider the frequency dependence since there may be an
external event that effects not only occurrence of losses but also their sizes simultaneously
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in different departments of a bank1. Though severity dependence has been suggested in
some papers (see Lindskog and A.McNeil (2003), Chapelle, Y.Crama, G.Hubner, and
J.Peters (2004)), it has never been computationally incorporated into existing models,
leaving this issue for future research. Our approach helps to decrease inaccuracy in the
measurement of bank’s exposure to operational risk by accounting for these two sources
of dependence.
When implementing our computations for different cases of loss dependence, we ex-
amine the difference in values of the CaR obtained using the model suggested and via the
LDA. The underlying assumption of the LDA is rather conservative: the capital charge
is computed as a simple sum of the operational risk VaR for each class of risk (business
line/risk type cell)2. Frachot, T.Roncalli, and E.Salomon (2004) show that this way of
computing CaR is equivalent to assuming perfect correlation across operational losses of
different classes of risk. This means that in case of an operational risk event, the latter
would cause operational losses simultaneously in all divisions of a bank. Though this
may happen, for example, in case of an event similar to the 9/11, this is not likely in
general. Therefore if the underlying loss correlation is not perfect, the LDA would result
in overestimation of aggregate losses and the CaR value.
The results of this work show that in all cases considered, values of the CaR obtained
based on the LDA approach are higher than values obtained via the model suggested.
This finding supports the hypothesis about overestimation of the CaR computed via
the regulatory LDA unless the underlying loss dependence is perfect. Another important
result, which is in line with this hypothesis, shows that the closer loss dependence between
risk classes approaches one, the smaller the difference between CaRs computed in these
two models. Implementation of the model results in the following reduction of the CaR
when compared to the corresponding values obtained based on the LDA: 18.51% in the
1It is a common argument in the operational risk modelling literature that operational losses do in general
exhibit dependence in their severity (see Chavez-Demoulin, Embrechts, and Neslehova (2006), Lindskog and
A.McNeil (2003)). Think about major economic events, weather catastrophes or terrorist attacks like September
11. Such severe events will typically effect several business lines and cause simultaneous increase in operational
loss sizes across them. For example, banks in Manhattan have experienced increase in the loss amounts in trading
and sales as well as in payment and settlement due to the 9/11 attacks (see Lacker (2003), Bonturi, Koen, and
Lenain (2002), Johnston and Nedelescu (2005), Chen and Siembs (2004), Kaganoff-Stern (2004)).
2According to BCBS, each class of risk of a bank includes losses within a certain business line as for example,
BL “Payment and Settlement”, and that are due to a certain operational risk type as for example, “Internal
Fraud”. Basel II defines 7 risk types and 8 business lines, which results in 56 risk classes.
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case of aggregate loss independence and 2.78% in the case when loss dependence measured
by the Kendall’s tau is 0.78.
In addition, we implement numerical evaluation of the capital charge when it is com-
puted as expected shortfall (ES). This risk measure is not suggested by regulators, however
its coherence property (see Artzner, F.Delbaen, Eber, and D.Heath (1999)) has advan-
tageous implications on the capital at risk. ES is more conservative than VaR, which
results in higher values of capital charge compared to the regulatory setting. At the same
time, this measure reflects a possible exposure to extreme losses better: it tells about the
potential size of the loss that exceeds VaR. Given possibility of rare but high magnitude
operational risk ‘tail events’, the ES is more reliable than VaR. Our numerical analysis
revels a similar level of capital reduction of the CaR computed as ES if compared to
VaR: 18.05% in the case of aggregate loss independence and 3.39% in the case when loss
dependence is 0.78.
Note that when computed by a bank, the reductions of the CaR can be higher or lower
then those obtained in our numerical exercise. This is because parameters/types of the
loss and frequency distributions of a class of risk of a bank can differ from those used in this
study. In addition, the accuracy of the estimated results is negatively affected by a small
sample size of simulated values of CaR (200 values). The latter is due to computational
intensity of sampling dependent aggregate loss data and estimating V aR99.9% and ES99.9%.
Finally, the results obtained relate to the dependence between two classes of risk only,
implying that for a bank, the reduction can be much higher when dependence between
all 56 risk classes is considered.
The results of this paper show that accounting for loss dependence in the value of
CaR improves its accuracy. This is important for banks and regulators because for banks,
the capital charge should reflect their true operational risk exposure. For regulators, the
capital charge that is correctly computed across all banks would help to preserve stability
in the banking and financial sectors of the economy.
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1.2 Related Research
Since operational risk management is a relatively new area in banking, the literature on
this topic both by scientific researchers and practitioners, is currently growing, with a
particular focus on quantitative methodologies and their implementation. One group of
papers in this field describes practical implementation of the standard LDA described
by BIS (2006). Papers by Frachot and T.Roncalli (2001), Frachot, O.Moudoulaud, and
T.Roncalli (2003), Frachot, T.Roncalli, and N.Baud (2002) explore this approach for
computing bank’s capital charge for operational risk and show the way this capital can
be allocated within different divisions of a bank.
To our knowledge, the first paper that addresses the issue of possible overestimation of
the CaR for operational losses obtained via the LDA is the paper by Frachot, T.Roncalli,
and E.Salomon (2004). The authors refer to the ‘correlation problem’3. They show
that following the LDA and computing the capital charge of a bank by summing up the
capital charges across different classes of risk implies the assumption of perfect positive
correlation between aggregate operational losses. They state that, with a strong or even
perfect frequency correlation, the loss dependence on an aggregate level is lower and is not
perfect. They propose a formula to compute CaR that accounts for underlying correlation
between loss frequencies. Important limitation of their approach is that it ignores possible
dependence between loss severities. As we mentioned before, it is as important to consider
the severity dependence as it is to consider the frequency dependence. There are two
papers, one by Lindskog and A.McNeil (2003) and another one by Chapelle, Y.Crama,
G.Hubner, and J.Peters (2004) that recommend to consider severity dependence in the
loss dependence modelling. However, in both papers, authors do not incorporate this
dependence into the models they propose, leaving this issue for the future research.
As the standard LDA originates from actuarial techniques developed and used in the
insurance industry, a lot of information on the subject can be found in books and papers
by Klugman, H.Panjer, and G.Willmot (1998), Panjer (1981), Panjer and G.Willmot
(1986), Robertson (1992), Venter (1983), Willmot and X.Lin (2000), Tripp, H.Bradley,
3Note that we prefer to refer to ‘correlation problem’ as ‘dependence problem’. This is because for non-elliptical
distributions, which is often true for loss distributions, correlation is not appropriate measure of dependence.
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and R.Devitt (2004). When applying these techniques to operational loss data, it is
important to account for its threshold and selection biases, poor quality and a small
sample size. Baud, A.Frachot, and T.Roncalli (2002), for example, describe MLE that
accounts for thresholds and therefore handles possible heterogeneity of data.
Quantification via the LDA assumes separate modelling of operational loss frequencies
and operational loss severities. Research results in this area have shown that calibra-
tion of these distributions (i.e. the choice of the distribution type and estimation of
its parameters) is the most demanding task because of the poor quality and a small
sample size of available operational loss data (see Fontnouvelle and E.Rosengren (2004),
Moscadelli (2004), Fontnouvelle, V.DeJesus-Rueff, J.Jordan, and E.Rosengren (2003),
Alvarez (2001), Embrechts, C.Kluppelberg, and T.Mikosch (1997), McNeil and Saladin
(1997), McNeil (1999), Chapelle, Y.Crama, G.Hubner, and J.Peters (2004) and Roehr
(2002)).
Finally, there is an extensive literature on dependence modelling both, using copulas
and mixture models. The latter models have been often described in the literature on
credit risk (see, for example, Frey and McNeil (2003), Duffie and K.Singleton (1999) and
Lando (1998)). As to copulas, we refer to the books by McNeil, Frey, and Embrechts
(2005) and Cherubini, E.Luciano, and W.Vecchiato (2004) and papers by Embrechts,
F.Lindskog, and A.McNeil (2001), Bouye (2000) and Dowd (2005) as useful sources on
the subject.
1.3 The LDA for Operational Risk
Once considered primarily in the context of back-office functions, operational risk is rel-
evant to almost all aspects of banking business. There is still ongoing debate concerning
general definition of operational risk. Many institutions describe this risk as all risks
other than market and credit risks. Regulators define this risk as “...the risk of direct or
indirect loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or
from external events” BIS (2006). Strategic and reputational risks are not included in
this definition.
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The regulatory capital scheme is based on three different methods: the Basic Indica-
tor Approach (BIA), the Standardized Approach (SA) and the most sophisticated one,
the Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA). Under the AMA, which is the most risk-
sensitive, banks may choose the LDA (see Figure 1 in Appendix B) or alternatively, any
other internal operational risk measurement model developed by a bank.
In the Basel framework, all operational losses are attributed to a “class of risk”,where
each class designates one cell among the 7 risk types × 8 business lines cells4. Implemen-
tation of the LDA involves five steps. First, banks model the severity of loss events. The
amount of one loss event for the business line i and the event type j is a random vari-
able X(i, j). Within each class of risk, the loss amounts are independent and identically
distributed. The distribution of loss amounts Fi,j describes the currency values of bank’s
individual loss events.
The second step involves modelling of frequency of loss events. The number of losses
N(i, j) is random over a specified time horizon τ and frequency probability function pi,j
provides information about the number of loss events that could occur between times t
and t+ τ and associated probabilities.
Estimation of the compound operational loss distribution Gi,j of each class of risk is
implemented in the third step. Based on the previously generated frequency and severity
distributions it is defined as
Gi,j(x) =

∑∞
n=1 pi,j(n)F
n∗
i,j if x > 0;
pi,j(0) if x = 0,
where ∗ is the convolution operator on distribution functions and F n∗ is the n-fold con-
volution of F with itself. In general, there is no analytical expression of the compound
loss distribution. Computing this distribution requires numerical algorithms such as the
Monte Carlo method (Frachot and T.Roncalli (2001)), Panjer’s recursive algorithm (Pan-
jer (1981)), the Heckman-Meyers method (Heckman and G.Meyers (1983)) and the Fast
4The eight business lines are: Corporate Finance; Trading and Sales; Retail Banking; Payment and Settlement;
Agency Services; Commercial Banking; Asset Management; and Retail Brokerage. The seven loss types are:
Internal Fraud; External Fraud; Employment Practices and Workplace Safety; Clients, Products and Business
Practices; Damage to Physical Assets; Business Disruption and System Failure; and Execution, Delivery and
Process Management
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Fourier Transform techniques (Robertson (1992), Wang (1998)).
Once estimated, banks use the compound loss distribution to obtain the CaR for each
class of risk. BIS (2006) defines the regulatory capital charge (or the CaR) for operational
risk as a Value-at-Risk measure5 computed for one year holding period and α = 99.9%
confidence interval:
CaR(i, j;α) = G−1i,j (α). (1.1)
Finally, in the last step, the total capital charge for operational risk CaR(α) of a bank
is obtained by summing up capital charges across all classes of risk:
CaR(α) =
8∑
i=1
7∑
j=1
CaR(i, j;α). (1.2)
In their paper, Frachot, T.Roncalli, and E.Salomon (2004) show that computation of
the total capital charge as it is presented in (2), implies the assumption of perfect positive
dependence between aggregate losses of different classes of risk.
Note that the CaR computed as the VaR, has limitations as it is not a coherent risk
measure in the sense of Artzner, F.Delbaen, Eber, and D.Heath (1999). It lacks the
property of subadditivity and does not tell anything about the potential size of the loss
that exceeds it. To circumvent this problem, the concept of expected shortfall has been
introduced by the same authors. Basically, this measure is a conditional expectation of
X, given that it exceeds a selected level L of the distribution:
ESα(X) := E[X | X ≥ L].
The level L can correspond to some threshold value or to be a value of the VaR itself. As
coherent risk measure, expected shortfall is more advantageous than VaR. Consequently,
we go beyond the regulatory setting and compute values of CaR not only as VaR, but
also as values of expected shortfall for L = V aRα and α = 99.9%:
ESα(X) := E[X | X ≥ VaRα(X)].
In contrast to VaR, expected shortfall (ES) is not a point measure of risk - the shape
5Given a confidence level α ∈ (0, 1), VaR is equal to the smallest number x such that the probability that the
loss X exceeds x is no greater than 1− α: VaRα(X) := inf{x ∈ R | P (X > x) ≤ 1− α}.
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of the distribution enters into risk computations. As a result, banks have to require
information about the tail of distribution of losses, which improves their risk management
process.
1.4 The Model
1.4.1 Assumptions
As in the LDA, all operational losses are attributed to a class of risk. Each class of risk
i covers losses within one business line and that are due to some risk event j. Between
times t and t+ τ , the following assumptions are applied
• The amount (severity) of one loss event is a random variable Xi,j, i = 1, ..., k,
j = 1, ...,m. The loss amounts Xi,j are independent and identically distributed and
follow severity distribution as Fi,j(x). We assume that Fi,j(x) is Pareto.
• The number of losses Ni,j is random and has a probability function pi,j(n). The
loss frequency distribution of Ni,j is Pi,j(n) =
∑n
q=0 pi,j(q) and we assume that it is
Negative Binomial.
• The common distribution of Xi,j does not depend on Ni,j and the distribution of
Ni,j does not depend on the values of Xi,j.
• For class of risk i with losses due to an event type j, the random sum Li,j =
X1 + . . . + XNi,j corresponds to the aggregate loss amount and has the following
distribution function
FLi,j(x) =

∑∞
n=1 pi,j(n)F
n∗
i,j (x) if x > 0;
p(0) if x = 0,
where ∗ is the convolution operator on distribution functions and F n∗i,j is the n-fold
convolution of Fi,j with itself.
• There is dependence ds between loss severities (amounts) of different classes of risk.
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• There is dependence df between loss frequencies (occurrences) of different classes of
risk.
• There is dependence d between aggregate losses of different classes of risk.
Since Pareto and Negative Binomial distributions belong to the class of non-elliptical
distributions, we chose the Kendall’s tau measure of dependence6. When implementing
the model, we consider two classes of risk only and we assume that losses in each class of
risk occur due to only one type of risk event.
1.4.2 Loss Dependence
We consider three types of loss dependence. The first type is dependence between loss
severities. We may observe that historically, the loss amounts are high (or low) in one
business line of a bank when the loss amounts are high (or low) in another business line
of a bank. This can be explained by the fact that severities of losses in both business
lines are dependent because they are driven by the same factor (macroeconomic, political,
internal for a bank etc.). The second type of loss dependence, namely dependence between
loss frequencies, can be explained in a similar way except that we consider the number of
losses instead of loss amounts. Finally, after aggregation of losses on the level of a class
of risk we obtained a third type of loss dependence, which is dependence between risk
classes, and which is driven by the underlying frequency and severity dependencies.
We implement dependence modelling using mixture models. In general, these mod-
els have been commonly used in the literature on credit risk (for example, Duffie and
K.Singleton (1999) and Lando (1998) use Bernoulli mixture models.). In this work, we
use the common Exponential-Gamma mixture to model dependent severities and the
common Poisson-Gamma mixture to model dependent frequencies. We chose these types
of mixture models because they are easy to implement and allow us to model depen-
dent Pareto severities and Negative Binomial frequencies of losses correspondingly. The
choice of aforementioned distributions is justified by the results of the empirical studies by
Moscadelli (2004) and Fontnouvelle, V.DeJesus-Rueff, J.Jordan, and E.Rosengren (2003).
6dKendall(Ya, Yb) =
(
n
2
)−1∑
1≤t<s≤n sign((Yt,a − Ys,a)(Yt,b − Ys,b).
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They show that loss severities attributed to some business lines of a bank are well mod-
elled by Pareto distribution. As to loss frequencies, the studies mentioned above show
that Negative Binomial distribution provides a very good fit to the occurrence of opera-
tional losses, and is a better choice than a Poisson distribution. The latter distribution
implies a constant rate of loss occurrence over time, which is not the case in reality.
We assume that amounts of operational losses of different class of risk are due to re-
alization of a particular random variable θs. This parameter is characterized by some
distribution function. For any given θs, the individual conditional severity distributions
are independent and follow exponential distribution. However, unconditionally, these dis-
tributions are dependent with dependence coming through the same random parameter
θs. Similar to the severity case, there is an external factor θf that effects frequencies of
operational losses. Given this parameter, individual conditional frequency distributions
are independent and follow a Poisson process. Unconditionally, however, these distribu-
tions are dependent. By modelling the uncertainty about the external mechanism in both
cases via the Gamma-distributed parameters θs and θf , we construct dependent Pareto
(γs, βi) severities with the joint survivor function given as:
SX1,...,Xi(t1, . . . , ti) = (1 +
1
β1
t1 + . . .+
1
βi
ti)
−γs , (1.3)
and dependent Negative Binomial (γf , λi) frequencies with the joint probability generating
function described as
PN1,...,Ni(t1, . . . , ti) = [1− λ1(t1 − 1)− . . .− λk(ti − 1)]−γf . (1.4)
A formal description of the above-mentioned mixture models is presented in Appendix
A.
1.5 Implementation and Numerical Results
Table 1 shows summary statistics about assumed Pareto severity and Negative Binomial
frequency of operational losses for each class of risk. Both severity distributions are heavy-
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tailed, skewed to the right and have high standard deviations. Severity distribution of the
second class is more heavy-tailed than severity distribution of the first class of risk. First
class of risk has higher loss occurrence than a second class. Similar to severities, frequency
distributions are skewed to the right. Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of loss
distributions under consideration.
We consider the following cases of loss dependence (see Table 2): loss frequencies
are independent and so are loss severities (Case I); loss frequencies are dependent and
loss severities are independent (Case II); loss frequencies are dependent and so are loss
severities (Case III and Case IV). As a graphical illustration of dependence, Figure 3
shows scatter plots of severities and frequencies in Case III. One can see that loss severities
are characterized by a low level of dependence (values of severities are spread) and loss
frequencies are characterized by a high level of dependence (values of frequencies are
concentrated along the diagonal).
We implement a numerical evaluation of the capital charge using the compound model
and Monte Carlo simulation approach. We simulate aggregate losses on the level of class of
risk and of a bank 200 times and therefore obtain 200 values of CaRs. Figure 4 illustrates
the idea of our computations. In the LDA, first we compute CaR values for each class
of risk and then sum these values up to arrive to the CaR of a bank. In contrast, in our
model, the CaR of a bank is computed using aggregate losses on the bank’s level directly.
In the regulatory setting, values of capital charge are defined as VaR. We demonstrate
results of our computations if instead, the ES risk measure is used. Table 3 shows some
summary statistics of distribution of simulated CaRs. The size of the capital charge is
about 3 times higher when CaR is computed as ES versus VaR. Independently of the risk
measure used for capital allocations, in all four cases of loss dependence, the values of
capital charge obtained based on the LDA approach are higher than values obtained via
the model we suggest. This finding totally supports the hypothesis about overestimation
of the CaR computed via the regulatory LDA unless the underlying loss dependence is
perfect. Another important result, which is in line with this hypothesis, is that the closer
loss dependence between risk classes approaches one, the smaller the difference between
CaRs computed in these two models (see Figure 5). Implementation of the model results
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in the following reduction in the values of CaR computed as VaR when they are compared
with those obtained in the LDA: 18.51% in the first case, 15.39% in the second case, 7.86%
in the third case and 2.78% in the fourth case. The highest level of capital reduction,
18.51%, as we expected, is in the independence case. Similar level of capital reduction is
observed in the values of CaR when they are computed using the ES risk measure: from
18.05% in the first case to 3.39% in the fourth case (see Table 5 Panel A).
The above-mentioned results are obtained for simulated values of CaR when the true
parameters of loss distributions are used. In this study, we account for the fact that
in practice, the true parameters of the loss severity and loss frequency distributions are
unknown and have to be estimated. To address this issue, we implement MLE estimation
of parameters of the distribution of simulated loss frequencies and simulated loss severities
correspondingly. These estimates should asymptotically follow Gaussian distribution.
Using this property, we simulate 200 values of the severity and frequency parameters
according to their approximate distribution and compute values of the capital charge
using aggregate losses generated for each path of parameter estimates. This provides a
probability distribution of the CaR based on the estimated values of the parameters.
Table 4 displays the results of our computations when the estimates of the parameters
are used. Similar to the case with true parameters, the values of capital charge obtained
based on the LDA approach are higher than values obtained via the model we suggest
and the highest level of capital reduction is when the aggregate losses are independent.
This result holds for the CaR computed as both VaR and ES (see Table 5 Panel B).
Finally, Table 5 demonstrates that introduction of dependent severities has a stronger
effect on the reduction of capital at risk if compared to introduction of dependent fre-
quencies.
To evaluate the accuracy of our computations, we measure possible underestimation
of the values of the CaR when estimated versus true parameters of the loss frequency
and severity distributions are used. We define the probability p of underestimation in the
following way:
Pr{ĈaR(α) ≤ (1− p)× CaR(α)} = 1− CL, (1.5)
where ĈaR(α) and CaR(α) are the capital charges obtained using the estimated and true
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parameters correspondingly and CL stands for the confidence level. The expression in
(1.5) can be interpreted in the following way: only in (1 − CL) percent of the cases,
the value of the CaR is underestimated by more than p percent. The values of the CaR
computed using the estimates of the parameters are exposed to average underestimation
of 13.23% for 90% confidence level. The underestimation is stronger when the CaR is
computed as ES. We believe that in addition to non-triviality of adequate estimation of
sparse data in the tail of the distribution, the accuracy of ES for such a high quantile as
99.9% is negatively affected by a small sample size of the data in the tail.
Figure 7 provides a graphical illustration of the accuracy of the estimation of the CaR
computed as VaR as well as ES. It shows empirical cumulative distribution functions of
the values of CaR obtained in the model for both the true and estimated parameters.
1.6 Conclusions
This paper addresses the issue of dependence between operational losses and how it can
be accounted for in the value of capital at risk for operational losses of a bank. In contrast
to the Loss Distribution Approach described by regulators in Basel II, our model accounts
for underlying dependence between aggregate losses of different classes of risk.
Advancing previous research, the measurement of the above-mentioned dependence
accounts for both dependence between loss frequencies and dependence between loss sever-
ities. Though the latter type of dependence has been suggested in the literature, it has
never been computationally incorporated into existing models, leaving this issue for future
research. By accounting for these two sources of dependence, the approach under consid-
eration helps to decrease inaccuracy in the measurement of bank’s exposure to operational
risk.
We implement our computations of a capital charge when it is defined as VaR (regu-
latory setting) as well as ES measure. The latter measure is not suggested by regulators.
However, given its coherence property and that it reflects a possible exposure to extreme
losses better than VaR, expected shortfall has advantageous implications on the capital
charge for operational risk.
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The model implementation shows that, for different levels of loss dependence, values
of the CaR obtained based on the LDA approach are higher than values obtained via
our model. This result reveals that under certain conditions, the LDA overestimates the
values of CaR and that correct accounting for loss dependence has an effect on the amount
of capital charge. This finding holds for the CaR computed both as VaR and as ES.
The results of this paper show that accounting for loss dependence in the value of
CaR improves its accuracy. This is important for banks and regulators because for banks,
the capital charge should reflect their true operational risk exposure. For regulators, the
capital charge that is correctly computed across all banks would help to preserve stability
in the banking and financial sectors of the economy.
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Appendix A: Dependence Modelling
Dependent severities: the common Exponential-Gamma mixture model
Consider k continuous random variables X1, . . . , Xk, each representing individual operational losses
of different classes of risk. Assuming that there exists a random parameter Θ such that (Xi|Θ = θs)
follows an exponential distribution with the parameter θs, the conditional survivor function of Xi is
SXi|Θ(ti|θs) = Pr(Xi > ti|Θ = θs) = e−θsti , i = 1, . . . , k.
We further assume that Θ has a Gamma probability density function given by
pi(θs) =
θγs−1s exp(−θsβ)
Γ(γs)β−γs
θs > 0,
or, in other words, Θ ∼Gamma(γs, 1β ).
The moment generating function MΘ is given by
MΘ(z) = (1− 1β z)−γs .
For any given Θ = θs, the variables (Xi|Θ = θs), i = 1, . . . , k, are conditionally independent and have
a conditional joint survivor function
SX1,...,Xk|Θ(t1, . . . , tk|θs) = Pr(X1 > t1, . . . , Xk > tk|Θ = θs) = e−θs(t1+...+tk).
At the same time, unconditionally, Xi, i = 1, . . . , k are jointly dependent as they depend upon the
same random parameter θs. The unconditional joint survivor function for X1, . . . , Xk is
SX1,...,Xk(t1, . . . , tk) =Pr(X1 > t1, . . . , Xk > tk)
=
∫ ∞
0
e−θs(t1+···+tk)pi(θs)dθs
=MΘ(−t1 − . . .− tk).
Substituting the moment generating function of the Gamma distribution into the expression above, we
get the following survivor function of a multivariate Pareto distribution:
SX1,...,Xk(t1, . . . , tk) = (1 +
1
β1
t1 + . . .+ 1βk tk)
−γs , i = 1, . . . , k.
One can see from the joint survivor function that the marginal survivor distributions of the presented
multivariate model are Pareto (γs, βi)
SXi(ti) = SX1,...,Xk(t1, . . . , tk)|tj=0,j 6=i = (1 + 1βi ti)−γs ,
which implies the following cumulative distribution function for Xi
FXi(ti) = 1− ( βiti+βi )γs ,
that is of Pareto (γs, βi) distribution.
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Dependent frequencies: the common Poisson-Gamma mixture model
Let us consider k discrete random variables N1, . . . , Nk. Assume that there exist a
random parameter Θ such that
(Ni|Θ = θf ) ∼ Poisson (θfλi), i = 1, . . . , k,
where Θ ∼Gamma(γf , 1), has a probability density function pi(θf ) and a moment gener-
ating function MΘ(z) = (1− z)−γf .
For any given Θ = θf , the variables (Ni|Θ = θf ) are independent and Poisson (θfλi)
distributed with a conditional joint probability generating function (pgf) given as
PN1,...,Nk|Θ(t1, . . . , tk|θf ) = E[tN11 , . . . , tNkk |Θ = θf ] = eθf [λ1(t1−1)+···+λk(tk−1)].
At the same time, unconditionally, N1, . . . , Nk are jointly dependent and have the
following joint unconditional probability generating function:
PN1,...,Nk(t1, . . . , tk) =EΘ[E(t
N1
1 , . . . , t
Nk
k |Θ)] =
∫ ∞
0
eθf [λ1(t1−1)+...+λk(tk−1)]pi(θf )dθf
=MΘ(λ1(t1 − 1) + . . .+ λk(tk − 1))
=[1− λ1(t1 − 1)− . . .− λk(tk − 1)]−γf .
This joint probability generating function defines a multivariate negative binomial
distribution with negative binomial margins Ni ∼ NB(γf , λi):
PNi(ti) =PN1,...,Nk(t1, . . . , tk)|tj=1,i 6=j
=MΘ(λ1(t1 − 1) + · · ·+ λk(tk − 1))|tj=1,i 6=j
=MΘ(λi(ti − 1)) = (1− λi(ti − 1))−γf .
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Appendix B: Figures
0 2 4 6 8 10
x 10
4
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
x 10
−5
0 50 100 150
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06Severity Distribution Frequency Distribution
Loss Amounts Number of Losses
Aggregate Losses
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
x 10
5
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
x 10
−6
Compound Loss Distribution
Gi,j(x) =
∑
∞
n=0 pi,j(n)F
n∗
i,j
Figure 1. The Loss Distribution Approach. The figure displays the idea of the LDA.
First severity and frequency distributions are modelled. Second, the loss aggregate distribution
is computed via the compound model and using aforementioned distributions as inputs.
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Figure 2. Loss Distributions. The figure displays severity and frequency distributions of
each class of risk.
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Figure 3. Loss Dependence. The figure shows two samples: a sample of dependent loss
severities and a sample of dependent loss frequencies.
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Figure 4. LDA vs.the Model. The figure illustrates the idea of CaR computations imple-
mented based on the LDA and using the model we suggest.
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Figure 5. Capital at Risk: LDA vs. the Model: True Parameters. The figure shows
empirical cumulative distribution functions of the values of the CaR obtained using the LDA
(dashed line) and using the model we suggest (solid line). The results are given for two cases of
loss dependence: Case I (independence) and Case IV (high dependence). The CaR is computed
as V aR99.9% (upper panel) and as ES99.9% (lower panel).
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Figure 6. Capital at Risk: LDA vs. the Model: Estimated Parameters. The figure
shows empirical cumulative distribution functions of the values of the CaR obtained using the
LDA (dashed line) and using the model we suggest (solid line). The results are given for two
cases of loss dependence: Case I (independence) and Case IV (high dependence). The CaR is
computed as V aR99.9% (upper panel) and as ES99.9% (lower panel).
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Figure 7. Capital at Risk: Accuracy of Estimation. The figure shows empirical cu-
mulative distribution functions of the values of the CaR obtained using the model we suggest.
The results are given for each case of loss dependence and using the true (solid line) and esti-
mated (dashed line) parameters of the loss severity and loss frequency distributions. The CaR
is computed as V aR99.9% (left panel) and as ES99.9% (right panel).
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Figure 7 (Cont’d.). Capital at Risk: Accuracy of Estimation. The figure shows
empirical cumulative distribution functions of the values of the CaR obtained using the model
we suggest. The results are given for each case of loss dependence and using the true (solid line)
and estimated (dashed line) parameters of the loss severity and loss frequency distributions.
The CaR is computed as V aR99.9% (left panel) and as ES99.9% (right panel).
29
Appendix C: Tables
Panel A: Operational loss severity
Class of risk Mean Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
I: Pareto (1.37, 50690) 140 1300 22 649
II: Pareto (1.37, 72150) 194 1584 21 647
Panel B: Operational loss frequency
Class of risk Mean Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
I: NBin (0.61, 49) 31 41 2.4 10.4
II: NBin (0.61, 32) 20 27 2.5 10.6
Table 1. Moments of Loss Distributions. The table provides a summary statistics about
operational loss severity and frequency distributions. Mean and standard deviation of loss
severities are given in Euro, 000. Described loss frequencies are per year.
Loss dependence Case I Case II Case III Case IV
Severity level 0.00 0.00 0.27 1.00
Frequency level 0.00 0.82 0.82 0.82
Class of risk level 0.00 0.64 0.71 0.78
Table 2. Loss Dependence. The table displays values of loss dependence measured by the
Kendall’s tau. In each case considered, the resulting dependence on the level of class of risk is
driven by the dependence between loss frequencies and dependence between loss severities.
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CaR as V aR99.9% CaR as ES99.9%
LDA Model Reduction LDA Model Reduction
Panel A: True Parameters
Case I 214,282 174,617 18.51 % 705,181 577,890 18.05 %
Case II 214,474 181,463 15.39 % 699,718 580,076 17.10 %
Case III 214,493 197,637 7.86 % 677,356 618,827 8.64 %
Case IV 215,776 209,779 2.78 % 711,685 687,576 3.39 %
Panel B: Estimated Parameters
Case I 214,252 173,739 18.91 % 692,833 565,968 18.31 %
Case II 214,724 182,116 15.19 % 671,080 551,068 17.88 %
Case III 216,131 200,369 7.29 % 713,081 654,078 8.27 %
Case IV 215,380 208,856 3.03 % 694,288 669,535 3.56 %
Table 5. Reduction in the CaR. The table describes the reduction in the values of capital
charge computed in the model and when it is compared to the LDA.
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Paper 2
The Impact of Terrorism on
Financial Markets: An Empirical
Study
2.1 Introduction
A lot of research about terrorism has been done in the fields of sociology, political science
and history. As to economics and finance, terrorism has not received much attention
from researchers until recently. The effect of the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on
stock markets as well as that of more recent attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in
2005 has revealed that terrorism risk is a new type of catastrophic risk that investors and
financial institutions may be facing. The intention of this paper is to provide a deeper
understanding of the impact of this risk on the behavior of different financial markets.
When studying the impact, we look at global, regional, national and industrial market
levels. In addition, we compare the impact of terrorist events on financial markets with
the impact of other extreme events such as financial crashes and natural catastrophes.
Among existing research, this empirical paper is one of the very few (see Chen and
Siembs (2004), Eldor and Melnick (2004), Karolyi and Martell (2006)) that study the
link between terrorism and the behavior of stock markets. It is also the first one that
analyzes the impact on the bond and commodity markets. In contrast to impact studies
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that often employ only event-study methodology, in this work we investigate the impact
of terrorism using other methods as well. These are non-parametric methodology and a
filtered GARCH with the Extreme Value Theory approach. Both methods are standard
econometric tools. However, the way we apply them in this work is original.
The findings of our empirical investigation are useful for investors, insurance and
re-insurance businesses, banks and government agencies. The empirical results of this
work can give insights into portfolio diversification strategy with respect to the risk of
terrorism. To diversify this risk, investors may invest in industries and markets that are
less ‘sensitive’ in a negative way or, alternatively, in those that exhibit a positive reaction
to terrorist events. Regarding the latter aspect, we check the impact of terrorist attacks
on the bond and commodity/gold markets that are usually considered as those providing
‘safe-haven’ investment opportunities.
To study the impact of terrorism on financial markets empirically, we look at the
effect of 77 terrorist attacks that occurred in 25 countries over an 11 year time period (see
Table 1). We look at global, European, American, and Swiss stock markets as well as
the insurance, banking, travel, airline, defense, pharma/biotech, aero/defense and oil/gas
industrial stock indices. In relation to other markets, we look at the US, European and
World bond indices as well as at the global commodity and gold markets. When comparing
the impact of terrorist events on these financial markets with the impact of other extreme
events, we analyze the impact of 4 financial crashes and 19 natural catastrophes that
occurred during the 11 year period under our consideration.
When analyzing terrorism risk, data about terrorist attacks are of significant value.
To implement our analysis, we construct a database of terrorist events that occurred
around the world. We use publicly available information about terrorist attacks. Since
limited availability of historical information about terrorist events is often considered as
a restriction to modelling terrorism risk, we consider the data collection as one of the first
important steps in approaching the topic. In addition, and more importantly, we aim at
incorporating results about the impact of terrorist attacks on different financial markets
indices into our database (see Table 6). Adding a financial component to the database
makes it original and more valuable.
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The results of our work are as follows. Around two thirds of the terrorist attacks
considered lead to significant a negative impact on at least one stock market under con-
sideration. The Swiss stock market is affected by the highest number of attacks while
the American stock market by the lowest number. The insurance sector and the air-
line industry exhibit the highest susceptibility to terrorism, while the banking industry
is the least sensitive1. This is in contrast to financial crashes that demonstrate a strong
negative impact on the banking sector. The analysis of the impact on the aero/defense,
pharma/biotech and oil/gas sectors shows both positive and negative reactions. These
stock markets behave similarly in case of natural disasters and financial crashes.
As with terrorist events, natural catastrophes cause both positive and negative return
movements in the commodity/gold and bond markets. The gold index is affected by
a lower number of events compared to the commodity index, implying less sensitivity
of a former market to natural disasters. Finally, among bond markets considered, the
U.S. government bond market shows the lowest impact from terrorist attacks, natural
catastrophes and financial crashes.
As to the strength of the impact, terrorist attacks and financial crashes cause event-
day return movements that are mostly extreme, with the strength of the impact declining
in the post-event period. This implies that though markets perceive these events as
unusual, they do not see their effects as long-lasting. As to natural catastrophes, the
negative impact is more often observed in the post-event period. This can be attributed
to the fact that markets need more time to evaluate the long-term impact of such events.
In addition, natural disasters can last for several days and therefore the impact is more
likely to be evaluated during the period following the event.
The results of this paper suggest several diversification strategies for dealing with
terrorism risk. If concerned about this risk, investors should consider holding two groups
of assets: those that are likely to react positively to terrorist attacks or those that have
little or no negative sensitivity to this risk. In the first case, a U.S. Government bond index
is the safest choice followed by such industry stocks as aero/defense and pharma/biotech.
However, given that these stock markets may also exhibit a negative response, investing
1Note that the banking sector was affected negatively in the case of the 9/11 attacks. However, this event was
exceptional in terms of its magnitude and place of occurrence (Manhattan, the financial center).
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in these industries as a diversification strategy against terrorist attacks may not always
work. In the second case, banking stock index may be good for investment. Note that,
though this stock index is least sensitive to terrorist attacks, it exhibits significant negative
return movements associated with financial crashes.
In relation to terrorist attacks, investing in a composite commodity index is preferable
to investing in gold only. This is because, with terrorist events, the gold market reacts
negatively more often than positively. In addition, when it is compared to the commodity
market in general, the negative impact on the gold market is more long-lasting. At the
same time, the commodity market also shows a short-term negative reaction to some
terrorist events. This implies that investing in gold and commodity markets may not
always provide a good hedge.
Another possible way to reduce negative exposure to terrorist events would be to avoid
investing in insurance, travel and airline industry stocks. Note that insurance and airline
industries show high negative sensitivity not only to terrorist attacks but also to financial
crashes and natural disasters. This implies that by keeping these stocks in their portfolio,
investors may end up increasing their risk of loss if further terrorist attacks arise.
Finally, the response of financial markets to terrorist events suggests several strategies
of trading derivatives. For example, investors can hold long positions in put options on
the industry stocks that may react negatively to terrorist events (for example, airline and
insurance industry stocks). Or, alternatively, they can invest in call options, where the
underlying asset is a U.S. Government bond index.
2.2 Related Research
Analysis of the existing literature on the impact of terrorism on financial markets shows
that most of the research has a descriptive character and focuses on the impact of very few
terrorist events (often only those which occurred on September 11, 2001). Johnston and
Nedelescu (2005) examine cases where financial markets are directly or indirectly affected
by terrorist acts. They review the reaction of the markets to the 9/11 attacks in the U.S.
and attacks in Madrid in March, 2004. The main conclusion of their study is that financial
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markets are not only confronted with major disruptions caused by the massive damage to
property and communication systems, but also with high levels of uncertainty and market
volatility, especially in the case of the 9/11 attacks in New York (IMF (2001)). However,
there are some differences in the stock market reaction to these two terrorist events. While
attacks in Madrid were perceived as mostly having a regional effect, those in New York
were seen as having repercussions on the global financial system2. The authors view the
timing of attacks as a possible explanation for different impacts. Attacks in New York
occurred in a period of economic downtown. In contrast, the attacks in Spain happened
when the world economy was experiencing growth. We think that the difference in the
impact can also be explained by looking at the targets of the attacks. The 9/11 attacks
happened in Manhattan, the financial center, while the bombings in Madrid were targeted
at a transport system.
Further evidence of the impact of terrorism on financial markets is offered by some
impact studies. Among existing literature, this paper is most closely related to that
by Chen and Wei (2005). These authors examine the U.S. capital market reaction to 7
terrorist and 7 military attacks over the period 1915-2001, using an event study approach.
They apply their analysis to some other capital markets as well, but focus on the impact
of only two events: the 9/11 terrorist attacks and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
They find that U.S. capital markets rebound and stabilize quicker after these two events
compared to other markets, and that US markets are more resilient now than in the past,
which they explain by the strength of the banking and financial sectors in the U.S. One
of the main conclusions of their paper is that financial markets are efficient in absorbing
the shocks caused by terrorist attacks and can continue to function in an effective way.
Compared with the work by Chen and Siembs (2004), this study covers a much wider range
of terrorist events (77 versus 7) and applies not only the traditional event-study approach
but more rigorous econometric techniques such as the non-parametric methodology and
the filtered GARCH-Extreme Value Theory approach.
2The major worldwide equity markets experienced sharp and rapid declines, demonstrating that market par-
ticipants perceived the 9/11 event as a global shock. In contrast, the 2004 terrorist bombings in Madrid had much
less effect on the financial markets. The Dow Jones EURO STOXX fell by about 3% on March 11, and continued
to drop during the following days but had recovered almost completely by the end of the month. Similarly, after
a small decline, the Standard and Poors 500 returned to pre-March 11 levels in less than a month (Johnston and
Nedelescu (2005)).
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Eldor and Melnick (2004) study how stock and foreign exchange markets react to
terrorism in Israel. The authors consider 639 terror attacks during the period from 1990 to
2003 and distinguish the data by location, target, type of attack and number of casualties.
They show empirically that terrorism has a permanent negative effect on the stock market
but not on the foreign currency market. They conclude that these markets are efficient
in incorporating news about terrorist attacks and that there is no evidence that markets
have become desensitized to the terror over time.
Several studies consider the effect of the September 11th attacks alone on the stock
market. The paper by Carter and Simkins (2001) examines the impact of this event on
airline stock returns. They test whether market reaction on the first trading day after
the attack is the same for each airline or, alternatively, whether it distinguishes among
airlines based on firm characteristics. They find that market differentiates among various
airlines based on their ability to cover short-term obligations as measured by a ratio of
cash and equivalents to total assets. According to their study, airlines with low liquidity
are penalized the most. No statistical significance is found for such firm characteristics
as size, leverage and firm performance.
Other research focuses on the economic consequences and associated costs of terrorism.
In their papers, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Abadie and Gardeazabal (2005) study
the effects of terrorism on economic activity. Krugman (2003) refers to direct economic
damage costs, the budget costs of government responses to terrorism and the cost imposed
by the way people respond to fears of terrorism. The long-term economic impact of
terrorism is also studied by Karolyi and Martell (2006). Authors examine the stock
price impact of terrorist attacks in which traded firms are targets. They find that the
impact of attacks differs according to the home country of the target firm and the country
in which the incident occurs. They conclude that in countries that are wealthier and
more democratic, attacks are associated with larger share price reactions. According to
Raby (2003), airline, travel, tourism, accommodation, restaurant, postal and insurance
industries are particularly susceptible to increased terrorism risks. Regions and economies
where these industries are concentrated are likely to suffer most from falls in output and
employment. Supporting this point, there are several papers that study the relationship
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between terrorism and tourism (see Enders and Sandler (1991), Darkos and Kutan (2001),
Enders, Sandler, and Parise (1992), Pizam and G.Smith (2000)). They show that for
countries like Spain, Greece, Austria, Turkey and Israel, terrorism has a substantial effect
on tourism.
Some papers discuss ways of modelling and measuring terrorism risk. Frey and
Luechinger (2003), for example, discuss measurement issues and review different meth-
ods that can be used in this context. The paper by Pate-Cornell and S.Guikema (2002)
describes the model for setting priorities among threats and among countermeasures to
terrorism based on probabilistic risk analysis, decision analysis, and elements of game
theory. Their model accounts for the probabilities of different scenarios, the objectives of
both the terrorists and the U.S, and the dynamic competition between them.
There is a strand of literature that discusses financial instruments that can be used to
hedge terrorism risk: terrorism catastrophe bonds (CAT bonds) and ‘terrorism futures’.
In their paper, Bantwal and Kunreuther (2000) discuss CAT bonds in the context of
natural hazard events. However, given similarities between these events and terrorist
attacks, the paper’s conclusions are useful in the context of terrorism risk. The authors
identify factors that explain a relative reluctance of institutional investors to enter the
market of CAT bonds. Applied to terrorism risk, such bonds can be quite expensive since
capital market investors require high premiums to compensate for the uncertainty about
this risk. Among other factors are investors’ unfamiliarity with these new instruments and
difficulty with pricing. At the same time, terrorism CAT bonds still have the potential
to be attractive alternative risk transfer instruments when exposure to this risk is mixed
with exposure to other catastrophe risks3.
Since financial markets are quite powerful in terms of information aggregation, they
may be good predictors of terrorist events. The idea of ‘terrorism futures’ market has been
3There were two transactions that involved securitization of terror-related losses: the FIFA transaction, Golden
Goal Finance Ltd., initiated by FIFA governing body in September 2003 (OECD (2005)) and the Vita Capital
transaction implemented by Swiss Re in December 2003 (Brauner and Galey (2003)). In the first case, the CAT
bond was aimed at covering revenue losses that would arise in the event of cancelation of the 18th FIFA World
Cup scheduled to be held in the summer of 2006 in Germany. This transaction transferred the risk of the sporting
event being canceled due to natural/ man-made catastrophes and terrorist events. In the second case, the extreme
mortality risk was hedged by means of the catastrophe-indexed notes. These instruments were linked to a rise in
the annual mortality index from natural disasters, epidemics, war and terrorist attacks. While terrorism risk in
these transactions was not a main risk under coverage, the over-subscription for these instruments demonstrated
that investors were prepared to buy bonds with default tied to some level of terrorism risk.
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actively discussed in the press since 20034. The authors of the paper ‘Prediction Markets’,
Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004) comment on the potential of this market in the following
way: ‘Betting on human lives seems ethically questionable. Yet if it helps save lives, surely
the moral questions are mitigated’. The main concern about ‘terrorism futures’ relates
to possible speculative trading through Internet accounts and incentives for terrorists to
commit acts of terror. Despite the above-mentioned concern, we believe, purely from the
research point, that the development of terrorism futures as financial instruments and
their pricing is a challenging and interesting task.
In this paper, we compare the impact of terrorist events with the effect of other ex-
treme events like natural disasters and financial crashes. Johansen and Sornette (2006),
Johansen, Sornette, and Ledoit (1999), Sornette (2004) offer an interesting classification
of crashes (large declines in price caused by shocks) as either events of an endogenous ori-
gin associated with preceding speculative bubbles with log-periodic power law signatures
(LPPS) or as events of exogenous origin associated with the market response to exter-
nal shocks. They find that no striking news can be associated with outliers preceded by
LPPS, while outliers without LPPS have been triggered by news surprise. In other words,
exogenous crashes can be attributed to extraordinary important external perturbations
in the form of news. The authors conclude that most of the crashes are endogenous and
can be seen as the natural deaths of self-organized bubbles that give rise to specific pre-
cursory signatures, LPPS in particular. They define the 9/11 attacks and the coup in
the Soviet Union in 1991 as exogenous shocks and such events as the ”dot.com” crash in
2000 and the crash of October 1987 as endogenous shocks. The research implemented by
the authors does not have a direct link with the current work. However, there are several
interesting insights that one can take from their studies. First, methodologically, imple-
mented analysis relies on statistical properties of large losses that are, in turn, studied
by looking at drawdowns rather than at return movements. Second, a proposed theoret-
ical framework for critical crashes shows the link between crashes in stock markets and
critical behavior of complex systems. According to the authors, it is possible to identify
4In 2003, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) initiated the program called the Futures
Markets Applied to Prediction (FutureMAP). The aim was to set up an online futures exchange, where people
could bet on terrorist activities in the Middle East. However, the program faced a lot of criticism from government
and was abandoned.
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clear signs of near-critical behavior many years before the crash and to ‘predict’ in the
endogenous case the date when the system will become critical, which in turn, is very
close to a realized crash date. Finally, they test empirically two alternatives to describe
crashes: one by means of the EVT, and another by the rational expectation model they
develop. They conclude that large crashes are outliers that are better described by the
latter model.
2.3 Terrorism Risk
Schmidt and A.Jongman (1988) present 109 different definitions of terrorism, which are
obtained in a survey of leading academics in the field. In all these definitions the following
words appear most often: violence and force (83.5%); political (65%); fear, emphasis on
terror (51%); threats (47%); psychological effects and anticipated reactions (41.5%); dis-
crepancy between the targets and the victims (37.5%); intentional, planned, systematic,
organized action (32%); methods of combat, strategy, tactics (30.5%) Boaz (1998). One
of the largest reinsurance companies, Swiss Re defines terrorism in the following way:
‘Terrorism means an act or threat of violence or an act harmful to human life, tangible
or intangible property or infrastructure with the intention or effect to influence any gov-
ernment or to put the public or any segment of the public in fear’ (Brauner and Galey
(2003)).
From an economic and financial standpoint, terrorism has been described as having
several negative effects, such as reduction in the human and physical capital of a country,
increased costs of financial and other counter-terrorism regulations, vulnerability of crit-
ical infrastructure (power plants, nuclear facilities, chemical factories, bridges, pipelines
and water supply), increased financial instability, destruction in market infrastructure and
operations and decrease in investor confidence (see Johnston and Nedelescu (2005), Bon-
turi, Koen, and Lenain (2002), Abadie and Gardeazabal (2005)). Because of enormous
loss potential, terrorism risk may put high financial demands on insurance and reinsur-
ance businesses and induce high insurance premiums5. As of today, insurance companies
5As an example, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had a wide range of negative consequences on
the local and global levels. Nearly 3, 050 people were killed. Damage inflicted is currently estimated at around
80 bn USD , about half of which was insured; i.e. the most costly event in the history of insurance (Brauner and
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mostly transfer this risk to reinsurance businesses. When dealing with terrorism risk,
the main challenge for both types of financial institutions lies in its quantification. Even
though some models have been proposed to handle this problem, existing approaches are
linked with catastrophe modelling. In many ways, terrorism risk is similar to the risk of
natural hazards such as floods, earthquakes, hurricanes and storms. In all these events,
there is enormous loss potential and these events can affect entire economies. For ex-
ample, the 9/11 attacks have evidenced that terrorism is potentially a catastrophic risk
(see Table 2). At the same time, there are several crucial differences between terrorist
attacks and the above-mentioned extreme events. Unlike terrorist attacks, catastrophes
are natural events that occur without intent and their possible place of occurrence may
possibly be predicted with less difficulty. Terrorist events are characterized by dynamic
uncertainty in terms of their type (a suicide bombing, an armed assault, kidnapping etc.),
their target (military, personnel, government, facilities etc.) and place and time of oc-
currence. Terrorists may respond to security measures by shifting their attention to new
targets, changing the type of terrorist attack and the place and time of its occurrence.
In other words, they behave strategically. In contrast, the actions that can be taken to
reduce the damage from possible natural disasters do not affect the probability and the
place of occurrence of these events.
The main challenge is to predict the likelihood and the financial consequences of terror-
ist attacks and quantify a possible exposure to terrorism risk. In addition, when modelling
this risk, analysts are faced with a limited availability of historical data on terrorism losses.
But even if these data were easily accessible, it would not necessarily reflect the changing
expectations of planned terrorist activities today. In contrast, probabilities and conse-
quences of natural hazards can be modelled and quantified more easily using well-defined
methods and historical data6. Because of the above-mentioned characteristics, it is much
Galey 2003). Financial markets responded with sharp and rapid declines in the major worldwide equity markets,
demonstrating that market participants perceived the 9/11 event as a global shock. The decline in European and
global stock markets was quite strong: between September 11 and September 21, the Dow Jones EURO STOXX
index was down 17.3%, FTSE 100 fell by 11.9%, MSCI Asia by 14.4% and MSCI Latin America by 15.4%. In the
credit market, the LIBOR overnight was down 129 basis points and three months Treasury bill 103 basis points,
IMF (2001).
6Catastrophe modelers develop the first generation of models to provide insurers with reliable estimates of
losses from terrorist attacks. These models help to reduce uncertainty in estimates of terrorism risk (Kunreuther,
E.Michel-Kerjan, and Porter (2003)).
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more difficult to manage terrorism risk than the risk of natural hazards. This, in turn,
calls for more studies of terrorism risk, and our work is the first that analyzes differences in
the impact of terrorist attacks and natural disasters on the behavior of financial markets.
The above-mentioned uncertainties associated with terrorism risk and problems with
its insurability7 have induced government intervention into insurance markets in the
OECD countries8. In addition to actions undertaken, other ways to manage terrorism
risk, namely terrorism CAT bonds and ‘terrorism futures’ have been discussed by practi-
tioners and academics.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
2.4.1 Hypotheses
When implementing our empirical study, we test the following hypotheses:
• Hypothesis 1: Terrorist attacks do not have a significant effect on global, European,
American and Swiss stock markets.
• Hypothesis 2: Terrorist attacks do not have a significant effect on such industry
indices as insurance, travel/pleasure, airline, oil and gas, financials and banking.
• Hypothesis 3: Terrorist attacks do not have a significant effect on such industry
indices as defense and pharmaceutical/biotechnology.
• Hypothesis 4: Terrorist attacks do not have a significant effect on the commodity
and gold markets.
• Hypothesis 5: Terrorist attacks do not have a significant effect on the bond market.
• Hypothesis 6: Terrorist attacks do not have a significant effect on financial markets
on both the event-day and in the post-event window.
7Prior to the 9/11 attacks, terrorism coverage in the United States was included in most standard commercial
policy packages. The private insurance market had functioned effectively because losses from terrorism had
historically been small (Brauner and Galey (2003)).
8A good overview of U.S. and European approaches to insure catastrophe risk (which covers natural hazards
and terrorism risk) with particular focus on public-private partnerships and the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
of 2002 (GAO (2005b)) can be found in a recent report issued by the United States Government Accountability
Office (GAO (2005a)).
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• Hypothesis 7: Terrorist attacks do not have an effect on financial markets which is
similar to that of natural catastrophes and financial crashes.
2.4.2 Data
There are two types of data sets that we use. The first data set includes the daily prices
of financial markets indices. All indices are grouped into eight categories9 (see Table 3).
Data are obtained from DataStream, and for each index we consider daily prices for the
period from January 4, 1994 until September 16, 2005 if available (this corresponds to
3054 data points)10. Table 6 provides some descriptive statistics of the logarithmic daily
percentage index returns obtained for each index. Logarithmic returns were calculated
using the identity of:
Ri,t = LN(Pi,t/Pi,t−1), (2.1)
where Ri,t is the return on the index for period t, Pi,t is the price of the index at the end
of period t, and Pi,t−1 is the price of the index at the end of the period t− 1.
The second data set includes information about terrorist events. We construct a
database of terrorist events using publicly available information about terrorism pro-
vided by the Terrorism Research Center (TRA (2000)), the U.S. Department of State
(USDS (2001)), the Constitutional Rights Foundation (CRF (2001)), the World News
Map (WNM (2000)), the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO (2005)) and the
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA (2005)). Data cover 77 terrorist events that
occurred in 25 countries11 for the period from January 1994 to August 2005. Though
our list is subjectively determined, we select those terrorist attacks that are mentioned as
significant in the aforementioned sources12. Each terrorist event is characterized by the
date of attack, its type (armed assault, suicide bombing, bombing), the target, the place
9In addition to indices considered, we study the behavior of the Dow Jones Kuwait Titans 50 stock index. The
data for this Islamic index covers period from January 1, 1997 till September 16, 2005.
10For FTSE Global Banks and FTSE Global Financials, data are available from January 2, 1996; for MSCI
Europe Insurance and MSCI Europe Airlines, from January 2, 1995; for FTSE Eurozone Bond Index from May 1,
1998; and for FTSE US Bond Index, from December 31, 1999. As to S&P500 Index, the data on 12-19 September
2001 were not available because the stock market was closed due to the 9/11 attacks.
11Argentina, Austria, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel,
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, UK and USA.
12According to the United States Department of State, an international incident is judged significant if it results
in loss of life or serious injury to persons, major property damage (more than 10, 000 USD), and/or is an act or
attempt that could reasonably be expected to create the conditions noted (USN (2004)).
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of occurrence and the number of people injured, killed or kidnapped (see Table 1).
When comparing the impact of terrorist attacks with the effect of other extreme events,
we consider 4 financial crashes and 19 natural catastrophes that happened during the 11-
year period considered. The financial crashes are the Mexican peso crisis in 1994, the
mini-crash due to the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the Russian financial crisis in 1998
and the crisis in Argentina in 2001. The natural catastrophes include earthquakes, storms,
floods, cyclones, typhoons, tornadoes, tsunami and hurricanes. Table 5 lists 10 natural
disasters (from the total of 19 events under consideration) that were the most costly for
the insurance industry since 1994 to 2005.
2.4.3 Methodology
In general, the most commonly used way to study the impact of events is by means of
the event-study methodology (see papers by Fama, Fisher, and Jensen (1969), Brown
and Warner (1980), Brown and Warner (1985), Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999), Chen and
Siembs (2004), Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Dravid (1987), Pound and Zeckhauser
(1990)). This methodology, however, imposes restrictive requirements on the behavior of
returns on indices. In this paper, we go beyond this traditional tool and implement two
other approaches. These are the non-parametric conditional density estimation approach
and the filtered GARCH-EVT method. With the former, we gain the flexibility of having
no assumptions about the parametric form of the data. With the latter, we account
for volatility background, possible dependence between returns and the fat tail nature
of their distribution. Note that in the GARCH-EVT approach we are able to check the
abnormality of event-day returns only.
The Event Study Approach
We use the event study methodology to measure the magnitude of the effect of considered
extreme events on the behavior of stock, bond and commodity markets. When imple-
menting this methodology we test the hypothesis regarding the abnormality of markets’
returns due to specific events. This methodology is based on the efficient market hypoth-
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esis, which states that stock prices adjust to new information13 (see Fama, Fisher, and
Jensen (1969), MacKinlay (1997)). We compute abnormal returns on the indices using
a mean-adjusted return approach (Brown and Warner (1980)). This approach assumes
computation of the event-day abnormal return on the index in the following way:
ARt = Rt −R, (2.2)
where ARt is the excess return for index at time t, Rt is the return on index at the time
of event t, and R is the average return on the index taken over the interval of 20 days in
the estimation window t ∈ [−11;−30]:
R =
1
20
t=−30∑
t=−11
Rt. (2.3)
We also look at the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over the interval of 6 days in
the post-event window. The CAR corresponding to an event that happening at time t
(j=0) is computed as
CARt =
j=5∑
j=0
ARj. (2.4)
In contrast to event-day abnormal returns, which show the immediate investors’ reac-
tion on the terrorist event, the 6-day CARs provide an indication of the market response
to the event 6 days following the attack. Usually, in event studies, the values of CARs is
of more interest than the values of ARs. This is because significant negative CARs would
reveal that an event had a strong impact on the markets, and insignificant negative CARs
would indicate the markets’ resilience to this event and their ability to recover quickly.
We test the statistical significance of abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns using
the test statistics described by Brown and Warner (1985).
13In other words, securities of a firm reflect all available information about the firm’s current and future profit
potential. If any information resulting from unexpected event is believed to effect a firm’s current and future
earnings, its security price changes as soon as the market learns about the event. To examine whether an event
had any impact on the firm’s values, event day abnormal returns (ARs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)
are measured and their statistical significance is tested.
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Non-Parametric Conditional Distribution Approach
In general, non-parametric estimation is a statistical method that allows a functional form
of a fit to data to be obtained without imposing any parametric assumptions. For example,
a Kernel estimation of an economic model y = M(x) + u, requires no specification of a
regression function M(x) = E(y|x) and the distribution of error terms. This way, non-
parametric estimation lets the data speak for themselves and overcomes a disadvantage
of parametric econometrics when inconsistency between data and a particular parametric
specification would result in non-robustness. At the same time, this gain in flexibility of
approach is not without consequences, as non-parametric modelling has to deal with, for
example, a selection of a bandwidth and a type of Kernel function. It is not the intention
of this work to give a comprehensive overview on the foundations of non-parametric
methodology. Rather, we want to describe an application of this powerful tool to study
the impact of terrorism on different financial markets. This application can be seen as an
alternative way to study the impact compared, for example, with event methodology. Note
that when an impact of some event is analyzed by implementing the event study approach,
the statistical significance of the effect of this event is checked by means of some test
statistics. The latter, in turn, imposes some restrictions, since test statistics require some
distributional assumptions with respect to the abnormal returns or cumulative abnormal
returns (CARs) which have to be satisfied.
We apply a local polynomial regression (LPR) to time series data to get a non-
parametric conditional distribution of stock, bond and commodity index returns. We
do not compute any test statistics to check the significance of negative abnormal and/or
extreme movements in the market due to terrorism. Instead, for each index and terror-
ist event, the value of conditional probability of a return - which is less than or equal
to the one empirically observed on the day of event - is analyzed. The abnormality in
the return corresponds to conditional probability in the interval (0.05; 0.10]. Where this
probability is 5% or less, the return is interpreted as extreme. This is our subjective
approach to distinguishing between extreme and abnormal movements. We assume that
a terrorist attack has an impact on the index if it leads to negative abnormal and/or
extreme event-day returns. Since we are interested in knowing not only the immediate
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reaction of the market to the event, but also the market response over some interval of
time in a post-event window, we estimate a non-parametric conditional distribution of
non-overlapping 6-day CARs. We make our inference about the impact of terrorist at-
tacks in the aftermath of the event by looking at 6-day CARs in a way similar to the one
described for returns. A brief description of the non-parametric estimation offered in this
paper is provided below14.
Let us consider a conditional distribution function pi(z|x) ≡ P (Zi ≤ z|Xi = x). Since
we work in the time series context, Xi is a vector of lagged values of Zi that are returns
on a index. If we assume Yi = I(Zi ≤ z) then E(Yi | Xi = x) = pi(z|x), consequently, the
problem of estimation may be viewed as regression of Yi on Xi.
Keeping this in mind and applying a local polynomial fitting to our time series data
of index returns Ri, we minimize the following expression:
n∑
i=1
(Yi − β0 − β1(Xi − x0))2Kh(Xi − x0), (2.5)
where Yi = I(Ri ≤ rt) with rt standing for empirically observed (realization) return on
the day of terrorist attack t, i = (1, . . . , n), n is a sample size and n=200; Xi = Ri−1,
x0 = rt−1; h is a bandwidth; Kh is a Kernel function.
Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the idea of non-parametric estimation im-
plemented in this work. We take the 9/11 attacks as an example and build the conditional
cumulative distribution function of returns on FTSE All World when conditioning is done
on the return on 10th of September 2001, a day before the 9/11 attacks. The conditional
cumulative probability of the return on FTSE All World, which is less than or equal to
that on September 11, 2001 is found to be 0.037. Since this value is less than 0.05, we
conclude that this terrorist event has an extreme event-day effect on this index.
We use a normal reference bandwidth selector (Fan and Yao (2003)), which defines
an optimal bandwidth hˆopt,n for the Epanechnikov kernel as 2.34σsn
−1/5, where σs is a
standard deviation of a sample. Implementation of this model leads to point estimates β̂0
14In general, LPR is introduced into the statistical literature by Stone (1977) and Cleveland (1979). Its
statistical properties are studied in papers by Tsybakov (1986), Fan (1993), Fan and Gijbels (1992), Ruppert
and Wand (1994) and many others. As to estimation of non-parametric conditional density and distribution,the
papers by Hall, Wolff, and Yao (1999), Linton, Chen, and Robinson (2001) and the book by Fan and Yao (2003)
are useful sources on the subject.
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and β̂1:
β̂ = (X′WX)−1X′WY, (2.6)
where W is a diagonal matrix, which i element is Kh(Xi − x0), and X is a design matrix
with a first column of ones. Obtained this way, a point estimate β̂0 corresponds to a
conditional probability of return on index, which is less than or equal to that empirically
observed on the day of the event (a terrorist attack) and when conditioning is done on
the value of return on the previous day. The same logic applies to a sample of 200
non-overlapping 6-day CARs. The value of the CAR on which conditioning is done is
computed as
CARt−1 =
j=−6∑
j=−1
ARj. (2.7)
We also implement a non-parametric estimation when conditioning is implemented on
the average of the returns R¯. We believe that this approach improves the inference since
the average return reflects normal market conditions better than just one return on the
day before the attack.
GARCH Filter with an Extreme Value Theory Approach
When studying the impact of extreme events on financial market behavior, one can com-
pare the event-day return on the index with the value at risk (VaR) predicted for this
day and computed for different levels of significance. In the case of terrorist attacks, if
the return on the day of terrorist event is lower than the computed value of VAR then
we may conclude that a considered terrorist attack had an impact on the index. This
method of studying the impact of events relates to the tail estimation of financial time
series and requires a well-chosen way to compute the VaR that from a statistical point of
view has a good predictive performance (a good fit model). In their recent paper, Kuester,
Mittnik, and Paolella (2006) give an extensive and detailed overview and comparison of
alternative strategies to predict VaR. They implement their study using the NASDAQ
Composite Index and show that the hybrid method that combines a heavy-tailed gener-
alized autoregressive conditionally heteroscedastic (GARCH) filter with an extreme value
theory (EVT) approach performs better than other methods.
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The GARCH method works as follows. First, a time-varying volatility model is applied
to the time series of returns. We assume the following dynamics of returns:
Xt = µt + σtZt, (2.8)
where Xt is a strictly stationary time series representing daily observations of negative log
returns on index, innovations Zt are white noise process and have a marginal distribution
function FZ(z). We assume the Gaussian distribution for innovations.
We assume that µt and σt are measurable with respect to =t−1, the information about
the return process available up to time t − 1. Similar to the paper by McNeil and Frey
(2000), we use the parsimonious but effective AR(1) model for the dynamics of the con-
ditional mean:
µt = ϕXt−1 (2.9)
and GARCH(1,1) process for the conditional volatility:
σ2t = α0 + α1²
2
t−1 + βσ
2
t−1, (2.10)
where α0 > 0, α1 > 0 and β > 0, ²t = Xt − µt and α1 + β < 1.
For each terrorist attack, we take a sample from 200 to 2500 past return observa-
tions15 (starting one day before the attack) and fit this model to the data by means of the
pseudo-maximum likelihood method to get the estimates of parameters θ̂ = (ϕ̂, α̂0, α̂1, β̂).
Estimates of the conditional mean series (µ̂t−n+1, ..., µ̂t) and the conditional standard devi-
ation series (σ̂t−n+1, ..., σ̂t) are obtained recursively from (2.9) and (2.10) using reasonable
starting values. When correctly specified and with a good fit, this model allows us to
obtain filtered residuals
(zt−n+1, ..., zt) =
(xt−n+1 − µ̂t−n+1
σ̂t−n+1
, ...,
xt − µ̂t
σ̂t
)
(2.11)
that are approximately iid, which is an important requirement for the EVT approach
applied below. Finally, the estimates of the conditional mean and variance for day t + 1
15We vary the sample size to get good backtesting results.
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are given by µ̂t+1 = ϕ̂xt and σ̂
2
t+1 = α̂0 + α̂1²̂
2
t + β̂σ̂
2
t , where ²̂t = xt − µ̂t.
We estimate the tail of the standardized residuals by means of the EVT, namely,
by applying the Peak-Over-Threshold methodology (POT). The latter approach focuses
on the distribution of excess returns over some threshold and applies a key result, due to
Pickands (1975), that the Generalized Pareto Distribution (GPD) is the limit distribution
of scaled excesses of iid random variables over high threshold. This distribution has the
following cdf for ξ 6= 0:
Hξ,β(y) = 1−
[
1 +
ξy
β
]−1/ξ
, (2.12)
where β > 0, y ≥ 0 when ξ ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ y ≤ −β/ξ and when ξ < 0. When ξ = 0, the
expression in (12) gets the form of Hξ,β(y) = 1−exp
(
−y
β
)
. When implementing the EVT
estimation, we first order the residuals z(1), ..., z(n) and fit the distribution in (2.12) to the
data (z(1) − z(k+1), ..., z(k) − z(k+1)), the excess amounts over the threshold z(k+1) with k
standing for the number of data in the tail. The quantile estimate ẑq for q > 1− k/n is
ẑq = z(k+1) +
β̂k
ξ̂k
((1− q
k/n
)−ξ̂k − 1). (2.13)
Finally, the estimate of the VaR is computed. If we denote the marginal distribution
of Xt as FX(x) and let FXt+1+...+Xt+k|=t(x) be the predictive distribution of returns over
the next k days then the quantile of the latter distribution is given by
V aRtq = x
t
q(k) = inf{x ∈ R : FXt+1+...+Xt+k|=t(x) ≥ q}. (2.14)
Because FXt+1|=(x) = P{σt+1Zt+1+µt+1 ≤ x | =t} = FZ((x−µt+1)/σt+1) we can compute
VaR as
V̂ aR
t
q = x̂
t
q = µ̂t+1 + σ̂t+1ẑq, (2.15)
where ẑq is the upper qth quantile of the marginal distribution of Zt obtained using (2.13).
Computed this way, the VaR accounts for the volatility background and fat-tail nature of
the distribution of index returns. These are two important stylized facts of most financial
return series.
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To evaluate the predictive power of the above approach, we implement a backtesting
procedure described in McNeil and Frey (2000). We update the AR(1)-GARCH(1,1)
model parameters for 500 moving windows and produce 500 one-step-ahead forecasts of
V̂ aR
t
q = x̂
t
q that are subsequently compared with actually observed values of returns xt+1
for q ∈ {0.90, 0.95, 0.99}. We implement this procedure when studying the impact of
every terrorist attack. A violation is said to occur when xt+1 > x̂
t
q. Finally, given that
the total number of violations is binomially distributed, we test the hypothesis that the
model estimates the conditional quantiles correctly.
2.4.4 Empirical Results
Summary
• Hypothesis 1: Terrorist attacks do not have a significant effect on global, European,
American and Swiss stock markets.
The results obtained reject this hypothesis and show a significant negative impact
of terrorist events on the above mentioned markets: according to the event-study,
55 out of 77 terrorist attacks (56 in the non-parametric case, 45 according to the
GARCH-EVT method) have a significant negative impact on the behavior of at least
one of these markets. The Swiss market is affected by the highest number of attacks
while the American market is affected by the lowest number of events. The reasons
for a strong reaction of the Swiss market to terrorist events can relate to several
factors. This may be because this index is comprised of fewer companies than the
S&P500 (less broad index). In addition, the SMI’s sensitivity may be explained by
the fact that this index includes stocks of companies that operate internationally
and that are potentially more sensitive to extreme events due to the nature of their
business. The results obtained for the S&P500 are quite reasonable given the fact
that only 4 out of 77 terrorist attacks we consider took place in the U.S. In addition,
the resilience of the American market to terrorist attacks can be explained by the
stable banking/financial sector in the U.S., which provides adequate liquidity to
promote market stability.
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• Hypothesis 2: Terrorist attacks do not have a significant effect on such industry
indices as insurance, travel/pleasure, airline, oil and gas, financials and banking.
The empirical evidence rejects this hypothesis and suggests a significant negative
impact of terrorist events on the above-mentioned industries. According to the
event-study 61 terrorist attacks (55 in the non-parametric case, 41 according to the
GARCH-EVT method) lead to significant negative return movements in at least
one industry index. Insurance and airline sectors exhibit the highest susceptibility
to these events (the MSCI Europe Insurance is affected by the highest number of
attacks), while the banking sector is affected the least. These results are quite in-
tuitive. Terrorist attacks often lead to fatalities and significant damage to property
that explains a high sensitivity of the insurance sector to terrorist risk. The results
support the conclusions of several studies (see Raby (2003), Bonturi, Koen, and
Lenain (2002), Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Darkos and Kutan (2001), Enders,
Sandler, and Parise (1992)) that identify the airline, travel, tourism and insurance
sectors as those that are particularly sensitive to terrorist events. With respect to
the lower level of impact on the banking sector, it is possible that banks’ operations
are not directly related to the businesses that suffered from the terrorist events.
Finally, the oil/gas stock industry shows both significant negative and positive re-
turn response16. This effect is observed at both global and European levels. The
negative reaction of these indices is observed more often than the positive and can
be explained by a fear of possible economic slowdown and a decrease in consumer
confidence. This especially relates to the transportation sector, for example, by a
drop in air travel. In turn, this leads to a lower oil demand and a decrease in oil
prices17. At the same time, a positive effect on oil prices is often related to the place
of attack (whether it can cause a danger to oil production and transportation18)
16The same reaction is observed at an individual oil company level: we analyze the impact of terrorist events
on the stock returns of Exxon.
17For example, ‘...oil fell more than 2 USD to 74 USD a barrel and US petrol futures tumbled to a seven-week
low on Thursday after Britain said it had thwarted a plot to blow up trans-Atlantic aircraft flights and investors
recalled the slump in fuel demand that followed 9/11. Oil consumption would again be hard hit if travelers turn
away from flights and consumer confidence takes a knock. Jet fuel prices in particular moved down sharply in the
weeks after September 11, 2001 and after the SARS outbreak in 2003’. New Zealand Herald (2006).
18‘If someone can fly planes into buildings, they can fly planes into a production facility,’ Emerson said. ‘So
it’s not irrational that there’s this fear premium in the market’, Washington Post (2004).
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and the oil market conditions at the time of event (if an attack occurs when the
market is tight because of increasing global demand). Importantly, in this study
we analyze the impact of terrorist events on returns on the event-day and in the
post-event window of 6 days after the attacks. Therefore, conclusions drawn from
our investigation, relate to the markets’ short-term reaction only.
• Hypothesis 3: Terrorist attacks do not have a significant effect on such industry
indices as defense and pharmaceutical/biotechnology.
The analysis of the impact does not support this hypothesis and shows a significant
positive reaction of these indices across all methodologies. Significant positive impact
on both sectors is observed for the bombings in Pakistan in 2002 (extreme return
movements). Significant positive impact on the pharma/biotech industry is found for
the bombings in Indonesia/Bali in 2002 and the armed assault in Colombia in 2005
(abnormal return movements). Significant positive impact on the defense industry is
identified for the bombing in Oklahoma City in 1995 (abnormal return movements).
When the post-event impact is examined over a longer time window (11-day CARs
and 30-day CARs), we find a significant positive response to such terrorist attacks
as that of 9/11, the bombings in Madrid and Egypt in 2004 and in London in 2005.
The possibility of a positive reaction by the defense industry to terrorist events is
also suggested in the OECD report (Bonturi, Koen, and Lenain (2002)). One of
the explanations of this result that we may suggest is that terrorist events may
induce the increase in government expenditure on defense and on research in the
pharma/biotech area in relation to preventive actions against possible chemical or
biological terrorist attacks19.
• Hypothesis 4: Terrorist attacks do not have a significant effect on the commodity
and gold markets.
The analysis of the impact rejects this hypothesis and shows a significant positive
19‘The tragic events in the United States on 11 September 2001 show that it can no longer be assumed that
the deliberate causing of mass civilian fatalities is impossible in the developed world. It will thus be necessary
to look again at the problems caused by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass
destruction. Of these, biological weapons pose by far the greatest threat, because they can be as lethal as nuclear
weapons and are easier to obtain. In fact, a crude attack with biological weapons would probably be easier to
plan and execute than was the attack on the World Trade Center’ (Fraser and Dando (2001).)
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reaction of the commodity and gold market’ returns to terrorist events. In addition,
a significant negative reaction is observed for some events. The gold market shows
more negative sensitivity to terrorist events compared to the commodity and bond
markets. Given that gold is usually considered to be a ‘safe-haven’ asset, these
empirical results remain difficult to explain.
Commodity and gold markets respond positively to some terrorist events (the 9/11
attacks) and show no significant reaction to other (the bombings in Egypt in 2004).
Finally, some events, as for example the London bombings in 2005, cause significant
negative return movements in the commodity index and have no effect on the gold
index. Such behavior implies that investing in the commodity/gold markets as a
hedging strategy against terrorism risk may not always work. This is because, with
terrorist events, these markets can react negatively.
• Hypothesis 5: Terrorist attacks do not have a significant effect on the bond market.
The analysis of the impact rejects this hypothesis and shows a significant positive
reaction of the bond market’ returns to terrorist events. In addition, a significant
negative reaction is observed for some events. The negative impact of some attacks
is mostly observed on the event-day only. Compared to other bond indices, the
Global Government Bond Index experiences significant positive return movements
more often than negative return movements. The FTSE U.S. Government Bond
Index displays the lowest level of impact, both positive and negative.
• Hypothesis 6: Terrorist attacks do not have a significant effect on financial markets
on both the event-day and in the post-event window.
The empirical results reject this hypothesis and show that terrorist events lead to
a significant response in financial market returns on both the event-day and in the
post-event window.
In most of the cases, the event-day stock return movements associated with attacks
are extreme and the strength of the impact declines in the post-event period.
In relation to commodity markets, significant return movements in the gold index
both negative and positive are extreme and often observed in the post event period.
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In contrast, a negative reaction by the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index is found
in all periods and a positive response is mostly observed on the event-day.
Among bond indices, the global and European bond markets react negatively in all
periods, while return movements are more often extreme than abnormal. Unlike
these two markets, the U.S. bond market responds positively to terrorist events
mostly on the event-day and associated returns have an abnormal character.
All financial markets perceive terrorist attacks as unusual events. While some of
them see the effects of these events as occurring mostly on the event-day only (the
U.S. bond market), some markets take a longer time to evaluate the impact and
reveal their reaction mostly in the post-event period (the gold market). Finally,
some markets (stocks, commodities, global and European bonds) react to terrorism
either on the event day or in the post-event window or both.
• Hypothesis 7: Terrorist attacks do not have an effect on financial markets which is
similar to that of natural catastrophes and financial crashes.
The results obtained partly support this hypothesis. There are both similarities and
differences between the impact of terrorist events on financial markets and the effect
of financial crashes and natural disasters. While the European and Swiss markets
show high susceptibility to terrorist attacks and natural catastrophes, their response
to financial crashes is less negative. At the industry level, the insurance and airline
sectors show a negative sensitivity to all types of the extreme events. Financial
crashes demonstrate a strong negative impact on the banking and financials sectors.
This is in contrast to the effect of terrorist attacks and natural catastrophes that
do not cause a strong negative response in the sectors mentioned above. Similar to
terrorist events, there are observed both a positive and negative impact of natural
disasters and financial crashes on such industries as oil/gas and pharma/biotech.
The event-day negative returns associated with financial crashes and terrorist events
are extreme. The sensitivity of stock markets to these events declines in the post-
event window. In contrast, natural disasters are associated with extreme return
movements more in the days following the events. This result may be because
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markets need more time to evaluate the long-term consequences of natural disasters
on markets’ returns compared to the two other types of events.
Both terrorist events and natural disasters cause positive and negative return move-
ments in the commodity/gold and bond markets. Among the latter markets, the
U.S. bond market shows the least impact from all extreme events considered. With
respect to the impact of financial crashes, our empirical findings confirm a traditional
perception of the commodity and bond markets as those providing ‘safe-haven’ in-
vestment opportunities in times of crises. This is because with financial crashes
these markets react positively.
Summary of the impact of different extreme events on the financial markets is given
in the Table 7.
The Impact of Terrorist Attacks on Stock Markets
• The Event-Study Approach
Tables 8-9 show the results of the event study. Analysis of the response of four stock
indices - FTSE All World, MSCI Europe, S&P500 and SMI to terrorist attacks shows
that 22 out of 77 attacks have no impact on any of these stock markets. Among these
events are not only local attacks that are characterized by very little or no damage
to property and people as for example, the bombing in Israel on May 27, 2001, but
also such events as the attacks in Argentina on July 18, 1994 that are considered as
one of the worst in terms of fatalities and the bombings in Sri Lanka/Colombo on
July 24, 2001 that are reported among the worst in terms of insured property loss
during the period 1970-2001 (OECD (2005)). In other words, the impact of attacks
on stock markets is not necessarily in direct relation to their magnitude in terms of
insured losses and fatalities.
Our investigation shows that 55 out of 77 terrorist events have a significant negative
impact on at least one stock index. FTSE All World and Swiss indices are affected by
the highest number of events while the S&P500 Index is affected by the least number
of attacks. We also check the reaction of Islamic stock markets by looking at the
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DJ Kuwait Titans 50’s response to terrorist events. This index experiences both a
significant negative and a significant positive impact of terrorist attacks and natural
disasters. In contrast, financial crashes cause only a significant negative response in
this index returns (see Tables 28-29). This index is affected in a negative way by a
lower number of attacks than are other market indices. A negative effect of attacks
is more pronounced compared to a positive impact. While a positive reaction is
mostly observed on the event day, significant negative return movements are found
more often in the post-event window. These results indicate that the Kuwait stock
market perceives terrorist events as negative news.
The 9/11 attacks as well as the suicide bombing in Israel on June 19, 2002 and
bombings in Madrid 2004, in Egypt 2004 and in the UK 2005 are good examples
of events that have a negative impact on stock markets at both global and local
levels. We find that the 9/11 terrorist attacks have a significant negative effect on
global, European, American and Swiss stock markets both on the event day and in
the post-event window. The S&P500 shows the strongest negative reaction in the
post-event window compared to other indices, which reflects a prolonged negative
effect of the 9/11 event on the American market. As to the negative impact of this
event on the European market, our results find support in the empirical paper by
Chen and Siembs (2004), where the authors conclude that European capital markets
experience significant negative 6-day CARs due to the 9/11 attacks.
The empirical results for various industry indices show that 62 out of 77 terrorist
events have a significant negative effect on at least one of them. The insurance sector
is affected by the highest number of events while the banking and oil/gas industries
are affected by the lowest number of attacks. Within the insurance sector, MSCI
Europe Insurance experiences the most negative impact and is closely followed by
FTSE All World Non-Life Insurance. These results are quite intuitive since terrorist
attacks often lead to fatalities and significant damage to property that explains
a high sensitivity of the insurance sector to terrorism risk. Unlike the insurance
industry, the banking sector is affected by the least number of attacks. It is possible
that banking operations are not directly related to the businesses that suffered from
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the terrorist events.
We find evidence of the significant negative impact of terrorist attacks on the FTSE
All World Travel/Pleasure and MSCI Europe Airlines. For both, almost half of the
attacks considered lead to a significant negative reaction. While the FTSE All World
Travel/Pleasure is affected more often in the post-event period, for MSCI Europe
Airlines this type of impact is observed less frequently. In addition, when charac-
terizing the impact on the airline index, we see that more than half the terrorist
events (out of 31 that have an impact) cause significant negative return movements
on both the event-day and the post-event window, reflecting a high susceptibility
of this sector to terrorism risk. These results support conclusions of several stud-
ies (see Raby (2003), Bonturi, Koen, and Lenain (2002), Abadie and Gardeazabal
(2003), Darkos and Kutan (2001), Enders, Sandler, and Parise (1992)) that identify
airline, travel, tourism and insurance sectors as those that are particularly sensitive
to terrorist events.
Analysis of the ARs and 6-day CARs shows evidence of significant negative (see
Tables 8-9) as well as positive (see Table 10) impact of terrorist attacks on the
aero/defense and pharma/biotech industries. Although the latter index is affected
less often, however, the strength of the impact is higher compared to aero/defense.
Among the events that have a significant positive impact both, on the event day
and in the post-event window are bombings in Oklahoma City in 1995 (FTSE All
World Aero/Defense) and in Pakistan in May 2002 (FTSE All World Aero/Defense
and FTSE All World Pharma/Biotech) and the armed assault in Colombia in April
2004 (FTSE All World Pharma/Biotech). If we consider four better known terrorist
events such as the 9/11 attacks, the bombings in Madrid and in Egypt in 2004 and the
bombing in London in 2005, we see that the reaction of these indices is negative ex-
cept for attacks in London in 2005, which have no effect on the aero/defence industry
and lead to a significant positive post-event window reaction in the pharma/biotech
industry. However, when the post-event impact is examined over longer time hori-
zons (11-day and 30-day CARs instead of 6-days), the results are different. For the
FTSE All World Aero/Defense index, we get statistically significant positive 30-day
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CARs that are associated with all the above-mentioned events. As to FTSE All
World Pharma/Biotech sector, only the bombings in Madrid and in London lead to
statistically significant positive 30-day CARs20.
The aero/defense and pharma/biotech sectors are not the only industries that expe-
rienced both a positive and a negative impact of terrorist attacks. An analysis of the
reaction of the oil/gas sector also reveals these two types of impact (see Tables 8-9,
11). This mixed effect is observed at both global and European levels. Among events
that lead to significant positive return movements both on the event-day and in the
post-event window are the suicide bombings in Russia in December 2002. Unlike
in the aero/defense and pharma/biotech industries, some terrorist events first cause
a significant positive event-day response in the oil/gas industry and then lead to a
significant negative impact in the post event period. This behavior is observed for
the 9/11 attacks21, the suicide bombings in Israel in 2002 (FTSE All World Oil/Gas,
FTSE Europe Oil/Gas), the kidnapping in Indonesia in 1996 and the bombings in
Russia in March 1999 (FTSE All World Oil/Gas). This implies that these markets
perceive these attacks as having a negative impact but this impact is not initially
distinguished on the event-days. Interestingly, the bombings in Madrid in 2004 cause
a significant negative event-day abnormal return movements followed by a signifi-
cant positive response in the post event window (FTSE Europe Oil/Gas). In this
case, the immediate negative reaction of the market may possibly be explained by
the fact that these bombings are targeted at the transportation system. As new
information is processed with respect to the long-term effect, the market reveals no
fear. Note that although the aero/defense, pharma/biotech and oil/gas industries
show both, positive and negative response to terrorist attacks, the latter type of
impact is more than twice as frequent. In terms of the strength of the impact, for all
indices considered, terrorist events more often cause negative ARs and CARs that
are statistically significant at 0.01 and 0.05 levels rather than at 0.10 level.
20Note that we checked the 11-day CARs and 30-day CARs for other indices such as travel/pleasure, banking
and financials. We did not find any evidence suggesting a significant positive impact of attacks on these indices,
implying that only aero/defense and pharma/biotech sectors exhibited a positive reaction to attacks over longer
time horizons.
21It is worth noting that after the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York City, oil prices fell by almost 40%.
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• The Non-Parametric Approach
The findings of our non-parametric estimation are summarized in Tables 10-11, 16-
17. The results in relation to the event-day impact of attacks are obtained when
conditioning is implemented on the average return.22 Similar to the findings of the
event-study approach, the impact of attacks on the stock markets is not necessarily
in a direct relation with their magnitude in terms of insured losses and fatalities. The
list of terrorist events that do not show any impact is similar to the one suggested by
the event-study approach. Our investigation shows that 56 out of 77 terrorist events
have an impact on at least one stock market under consideration. The Swiss and
European indices are affected by the highest number of events, while the S&P500
Index is affected by the least number of attacks. These results are similar to those
revealed in the event study. The non-parametric approach suggests similar results
with respect to the impact of extreme events on the Islamic Dow Jones Kuwait
Titans 50 to those found in the event-study approach (see Tables 28-29).
For all indices in category I (FTSE All World, MSCI Europe, S&P500 and SMI),
terrorist attacks more often lead to an event-day negative response and less often to
a prolonged negative reaction. Similar to the results of the event study approach, all
stock indices experience extreme event-day negative return movements more often
than abnormal return movements (see Table 16). The strength of the impact declines
in the post-event period. This result also applies to the industry indices with the
exception of airline, aero/defense and pharma/biotech sectors.
We find that 55 terrorist attacks make significant negative impact on at least one in-
dustry index. This result reflects the more conservative nature of the non-parametric
approach compared to the event-study methodology. The latter suggests that a
larger number of events cause a negative market response. This result can be due
22There are several reasons for this. First, as we mentioned before, the return on the day before the attack might
not represent normal market conditions as accurately as the average return. Secondly, analysis of the data shows
that there are quite a few terrorist attacks that have low even-day impact when conditioning is implemented on
the previous return, no impact in the post-event window and no event-day impact when conditioning is performed
on average returns. In addition, these attacks are such that their magnitude or place of occurrence suggest that
no impact on the given stock index is a reasonable result. Examples of such events for MSCI Europe are the
bombings in Sri-Lanka on July 7, 2001 and in Israel on August 4, 2002 and the armed assault in Pakistan on
August 5, 2002.
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to restrictive assumptions imposed by test statistics used in the event studies. At
the same time, the findings across different industries are quite similar among these
methodologies. The insurance and airline sectors show high sensitivity to terrorism,
while the FTSE Europe Oil/Gas, followed by the banking sector is affected by the
lowest number of attacks. Similar to the findings of the event-study approach, the
aero/defense, pharma/biotech and oil/gas sectors exhibit both positive and nega-
tive abnormal return movements associated with terrorist events. Events that cause
positive reaction are similar to those identified in the event-study (see Tables 26-27).
• The GARCH Filter with EVT Approach
The results provided by this method describe the event-day impact of terrorist at-
tacks only23 (see Tables 22-23). 45 out of 77 terrorist events have a significant
negative impact on at least one stock index. More than half of these events cause
extreme rather than abnormal event-day returns. The Swiss stock index is the most
often affected, while American and European markets exhibit the lowest level of the
event-day impact.
At the industry level, 41 out of 77 attacks lead to significant negative event-day
return movements in at least one industry index. The insurance and airline indus-
tries exhibit the highest susceptibility to terrorism (the MSCI Europe Insurance is
affected by the highest number of attacks). The oil and pharma/biotech sectors
exhibit the least negative event-day impact. The GARCH-EVT method suggests
a greater negative impact on the aero/defense and a lesser negative impact on the
pharma/biotech compared to the other two methods. At the same time, it also dis-
plays the presence of significant positive event-day return movements in these two
sectors, a result which is similar to the findings of the other two methods.
Some terrorist events, namely the bombing in Sri-Lanka/Colombo in 1996, the armed
assault in the US in February 1997 and the kidnapping in Indonesia in February 1997
are identified as those causing a significant positive impact on the pharma/biotech
sector. The impact of these events, however, is not identified by other methods.
With the exception of the above-mentioned events, the list of attacks that lead to
23See section 4.4.5 that explains limitations of the GARCH-EVT method.
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the positive event-day impact is similar across all methodologies (see Tables 26-
27). Finally, in respect to the oil/gas sector, the GARCH-EVT approach shows a
significant negative event-day impact of a smaller number of attacks and a significant
positive impact of a greater number of attacks compared to other two methods.
The Impact of Terrorism Events on the Commodity and Bond Markets
The results of our empirical analysis across all methodologies are presented in Tables 12-
15, 18-21. The gold market experiences significant negative movements associated with
terrorist events more often than positive movements. This is in contrast to the behavior
of the commodity and bond markets, which show significant positive reaction to attacks
more frequently than significant negative reaction. While a negative reaction by the gold
market is more often observed in the post-event period, other markets respond negatively
only on the event day. The latter case implies that the commodity and bond markets
show less negative sensitivity to terrorism than does the gold market. We do not find any
pattern that would relate the negative reaction of the gold index’ returns to the country
where terrorist event takes place.
The gold and commodity indices exhibit a significant positive response to the 9/11
attacks while neither a positive nor a negative significant reaction is associated with the
bombings in Egypt in 2004. The commodity market exhibits significant positive return
movements associated with the bombings in Madrid in 2004 and significant negative re-
turn movements associated with the bombings in London in 2005. In contrast, the gold
market shows no significant response to either of these events. Note that, in general,
commodities/gold and bonds are considered ‘safe-haven’ assets that benefits from unset-
tling world news. At the same time, the above-mentioned results show the presence of a
negative response by these markets to terrorist events. Such empirical evidence remains
puzzling.
The Global Government Bond index experiences significant positive and negative re-
turn movements. The former more often than the latter. The FTSE U.S. Government
Bond index displays the lowest level of reaction, positive or negative.
According to all methodologies, the 9/11 attacks and the bombings in Turkey in 2004
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cause significant positive response in the global bond index. The suicide bombings in
London in 2005 have a positive impact on the U.S. bond market, according to the non-
parametric approach. Other two methodologies do not reveal any impact of this event on
the bond markets. The bombings in Madrid in 2004 have a positive effect on the world
bond market according to the event-study and the non-parametric approach. The bomb-
ings in Egypt in 2004 cause neither positive nor negative significant return movements in
the bond markets. As with commodities and gold, investing in bonds can be a possible
investment strategy to hedge against terrorism risk. However, one should be aware of the
possibility of a significant negative response of these assets’ returns to terrorist attacks.
Effect of Natural Hazards and Financial Crashes
Event-study assessment of the impact of natural catastrophes shows that 7 out of 19
natural disasters24 have a negative impact on at least one of the stock markets considered.
This compares to 9 events distinguished in the non-parametric approach. The GARCH-
EVT methodology reveals a significant negative event-day effect of 4 natural catastrophes.
Across all methodologies, the European and Swiss indices are affected by the highest
number of natural hazards. A possible reason for this could be that many of the events
considered occur in Europe. As to the SMI index, its negative reaction may be due to a
more significant presence of insurance/reinsurance companies in the construction of this
index. The American market, followed by the global market is affected by the lowest
number of catastrophes. An event-day reaction of stock markets to natural catastrophes
can be characterized by both extreme or abnormal negative return movements. As to a
post-event window, the response is more often extreme than abnormal.
As with terrorist events, natural catastrophes cause both positive and negative return
movements in the commodity/gold and bond markets. The gold index is affected by a
lower number of events compared to the commodity index, implying lower sensitivity of
a former market to natural disasters. The FTSE U.S. Government Bond index shows the
lowest level of the impact and the European bond index demonstrates most of the impact
associated with natural hazards.
24For the FTSE All World the list of events covers 18 natural hazards.
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The results of the impact of financial crashes are as follows. While all stock indices
considered show a significant negative reaction to the mini-crash due to Asian crisis of
1997, none of them experience a significant negative impact after the crises in Mexico and
Argentina. Although the European and Swiss stock markets show high susceptibility to
natural disasters and terrorist events, these markets demonstrate less of a negative impact
after financial crashes.
At the industry level, the insurance sector and the airline industry show negative
sensitivity to both financial crashes and natural disasters. Financial crashes show strong
negative impact on the FTSE Global Banking and the FTSE Global Financials. This is a
reasonable result given the direct connection of these industries to the financial markets.
There is a positive and negative impact of financial crashes and natural disasters on such
industries as the oil/gas and pharma/biotech (see Tables 8-11 and 16-17).
Event-day negative returns associated with financial crashes and terrorist attacks are
mostly extreme, with the strength of the impact declining in the post-event period. By
contrast, natural catastrophes cause significant return movements, which are mostly in
the post-event window.
Financial crashes cause a significant positive reaction in the commodity and gold mar-
kets. While the commodity market responds positively mostly in the post-event window,
the gold market responds positively both on the event-day and in the post-event pe-
riod. With respect to the global bond index, financial crashes cause a significant positive
event-day and a post-event window return movements across all methodologies. Finan-
cial crashes lead to no significant response in the U.S. bond index. The above-mentioned
empirical findings confirm a traditional perception of the commodity and bond markets
as those providing ‘safe-haven’ investment opportunities in times of crises.
Different Approaches: Summary
The results presented in Table 22 and 23 display respectively a negative and positive event
day impact of extreme events on the financial markets. Tables 24-25 summarize the find-
ings of our empirical work across different methodologies. Comparing methodologies, the
GARCH-EVT approach shows the least number of extreme events that lead to significant
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negative event-day return movements in the indices considered. When it comes to a posi-
tive impact, the event-study approach often reveals a significant effect of a lesser number
of events. For 5 indices out of 7 that experience both types of impact, the GARCH-EVT
method shows more of the positive impact compared to other methodologies. The differ-
ences in the impact across methodologies can relate to the underlying assumptions they
impose on the market returns. The GARCH-EVT approach, for example, accounts for the
volatility background, dependence and fat-tail nature of the market returns. These are
important characteristics of financial markets’ returns that are not captured by the other
two methodologies. The letter methods can overestimate or underestimate the impact
of events. At the same time, the GARCH-EVT approach allows to study the event-day
effect only and is more computationally intensive .
2.5 Conclusions
This study shows results regarding the global, regional, national and industrial effects of
terrorist events on stock markets as well as the impact of attacks on the commodities
and bonds. Also, it compares the impact of terrorist events on financial markets with the
effect of natural catastrophes and financial crashes.
Around two thirds of the terrorist attacks considered lead to significant negative impact
on at least one stock market under consideration. The Swiss stock market is affected by
the highest number of attacks, the American stock market by the lowest.
The reasons for a strong reaction of the Swiss market to terrorist events can relate to
several factors. This may be because this index is comprised of fewer companies than the
S&P500 (less broad index). In addition, the SMI’s sensitivity may be explained by the
fact that this index includes stocks of companies that operate internationally and that
are potentially more sensitive to extreme events due to the nature of their business. The
results obtained for the American market are quite reasonable given the fact that only 4
out of 77 terrorist attacks we consider took place in the U.S.
The airline industry and insurance sector exhibit the highest susceptibility to terrorism,
while the banking industry is the least sensitive. This is in contrast to financial crashes
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which demonstrate a strong negative impact on the banking sector. The analysis of the
impact on the aero/defense, pharma/biotech and oil/gas sectors shows both a positive
and a negative reaction. These stock markets behave similarly in case of the natural
disasters and financial crashes.
The results of our study suggest several diversification strategies against terrorism
risk. If concerned about this risk, investors should hold assets that can react positively
to terrorist attacks or, alternatively, that have little or no negative sensitivity to this
risk. In the first case, the U.S. Government bond index is the safest choice followed by
such industry stocks as aero/defense and pharma/biotech. However, given that these
stock markets can also exhibit a negative response, investing in these industries as a
diversification strategy against terrorist attacks may not always work. In the second case,
banking stock index can be a good investment. Note that, though the this stock index
is less sensitive to terrorist attacks, it exhibits significant negative return movements
associated with financial crashes.
In relation to terrorist attacks, investing in commodities is preferable to investment
in gold. As the gold market reacts negatively more often than positively. In addition,
compared to the commodity market in general, the negative impact on the gold market
is more long-lasting. At the same time, the commodity market also shows a short-term
negative reaction to some terrorist events. This implies that investing in the gold and
commodity markets may not always provide a good hedge.
A possible way to reduce negative exposure to terrorist events would be to avoid
investing in the insurance, travel and airline stock markets. Note that the insurance and
airline industries shows high negative sensitivity not only to terrorist attacks but also to
financial crashes and natural disasters. This implies that by keeping these stocks in their
portfolio, investors may end up increasing the risk of losses in these cases where extreme
events occur.
Finally, the response of financial markets to terrorist events suggests several strategies
of trading derivatives. For example, investors can hold a long position in put options
on the stock industry sectors that react negatively to terrorist events. Or alternatively,
they can invest in call options on the bond index, where the underlying asset is the U.S.
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Government bond index.
There are both, similarities and differences between the impact of terrorist events on
financial markets and the effect of other extreme events. For example, the insurance and
airline industries show high sensitivity to all three categories of extreme events. The
banking industry shows little negative impact of natural hazards, which is similar to the
impact of terrorist attacks and in contrast to the effect of financial crashes. Terrorist
attacks and natural disasters cause both, positive and negative significant return move-
ments in the commodity and bond markets. In contrast, financial crashes have a positive
effect on these markets. Terrorist attacks and financial crashes cause an event-day return
movements that mostly has an extreme nature, with the strength of the impact declining
in the post-event period. As to natural catastrophes, the negative impact is more often
observed in the post-event period, implying that markets need more time to evaluate the
long-term effect of these extreme events.
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Figure 1. FTSE All World Index: 9/11 Attacks.
The figure shows a non-parametric conditional cumulative distribution function of returns on FTSE
All World obtained based on 200 observations when conditioning is done on the return on 10th of Sep-
tember 2001, a day before the 9/11 attacks. The dotted line corresponds to an empirical unconditional
cdf, dashed lines correspond to 95% confidence intervals.
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Appendix B: Tables
N Date of attack Country Type of attack Target Killed Wounded Other
1 18.07.1994 Argentina Bombing Personnel 86 300
2 22.01.1995 Israel Bombing Transport 21 69
3 19.04.1995 U.S.A Bombing Facilities 168
4 19.11.1995 Pakistan Suicide bombing Government 16 60
5 08.01.1996 Indonesia Kidnapping Personnel 26
6 31.01.1996 Sri Lanka/
Colombo Bombing Facilities 100 1500
7 09.02.1996 UK Bombing Personnel 6
8 18.02.1996 UK Bombing Transport 1 9
9 25.02.1996 Israel Suicide bombing Transport 26 80
10 04.03.1996 Israel Bombing Facilities 20 75
11 15.06.1996 UK Bombing Facilities 206
12 02.01.1997 U.S./UK Bombing Facilities
13 23.02.1997 U.S. Armed Assault Personnel 1
14 24.02.1997 Colombia Kidnapping Personnel 1
15 13.03.1997 Israel Armed Assault Personnel 7 30
17 17.04.1999 UK Bombing Transport 2 30
18 20.04.1999 India Bombing Facilities 5 47
16 13.09.1999 Russia Bombing Facilities 118
19 22.11.2000 Israel Bombing Transport 2 60
20 01.01.2001 Israel Bombing Transport 60
21 03.01.2001 Switzerland Bombing Facilities
22 25.05.2001 Israel Bombing Transport 65
23 27.05.2001 Israel Bombing Personnel
24 24.07.2001 Sri Lanka/
Colombo Bombing Transport 12
25 11.09.2001 U.S.A Bombing Facilities 3000
26 29.10.2001 Israel Suicide bombing Transport 3 9
27 29.10.2001 Russia Suicide bombing Military 3 1
28 28.10.2001 Pakistan Armed Assault Facilities 15
29 13.12.2001 India Armed Assault Government 7
30 27.01.2002 Israel Suicide bombing Personnel 1 100
31 09.03.2002 Israel Suicide bombing Personnel 11 52
32 17.03.2002 Pakistan Armed Assault Facilities 5 46
33 20.03.2002 Peru Bombing Transport 10 38
34 10.04.2002 India Armed Assault Facilities 5 4
35 10.04.2002 Israel Suicide bombing Personnel 8 22
Table 1: Terrorism Events
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N Date of attack Country Type of attack Target Killed Wounded Other
36 08.05.2002 Pakistan Bombing Transport 12 19
37 09.05.2002 Russia Bombing Personnel 42 150
38 19.05.2002 Israel Suicide bombing Facilities 3 59
39 14.06.2002 Pakistan Bombing Transport 11 51
40 19.06.2002 Israel Suicide bombing Transport 6 43
41 17.07.2002 Israel Suicide bombing Transport 5 38
42 31.07.2002 Israel Bombing Facilities 9 87
43 04.08.2002 Israel Bombing Transport 9 50
44 05.08.2002 Pakistan Armed Assault Facilities 6 1
45 12.10.2002 Indonesia Bombing Transport 202 300
46 26.12.2002 Philippines Armed Assault Transport 13 10
47 27.12.2002 Russia Suicide bombing Government 80 210
48 19.05.2003 Israel Suicide bombing Facilities 3 52
49 05.08.2003 Indonesia Bombing Facilities 10 150
50 15.11.2003 Turkey Bombing Facilities 25 300
51 15.11.2003 Colombia Armed Assault Personnel 1 72
52 05.12.2003 Russia Suicide bombing Transport 42 150
53 09.12.2003 Russia Suicide bombing Facilities 5 14
54 29.01.2004 Israel Suicide bombing Transport 11 30
55 01.02.2004 Iraq Suicide bombing Government 109 200
56 22.02.2004 Israel Suicide bombing Transport 10 62
57 11.03.2004 Spain Bombing Transport 191 1900
58 09.05.2004 Russia Bombing Government 6 56
59 04.08.2004 Greece Bombing Facilities - -
60 22.09.2004 India Armed Assault Government 6
61 22.09.2004 Israel Suicide bombing Facilities 2 16
62 07.10.2004 Egypt Bombing Facilities 34 159
63 24.10.2004 Turkey Bombing Facilities 6
64 15.04.2005 Colombia Armed Assault Personnel 4 23
65 18.04.2005 Russia Armed Assault Personnel 2 3
66 10.05.2005 Russia Bombing Military 2 2
67 10.05.2005 Colombia Other - - -
68 23.06.2005 Australia Other - - -
69 24.06.2005 Israel Armed Assault Facilities 5 12
70 25.06.2005 Spain Bombing Facilities
71 26.06.2005 Colombia Armed Assault Military 25 18
72 07.07.2005 UK Suicide bombing Transport 56 700
73 23.07.2005 Egypt Bombing Facilities 88
74 29.07.2005 Spain Bombing Facilities - -
75 15.08.2005 Russia Bombing Personnel 1 7
76 15.08.2005 Egypt Bombing Personnel 2
77 25.08.2005 Russia Bombing Government 1 2
Table 1 (Cont’d.): Terrorism Events
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U.S.$ Event Victims Year Country
Billion
32.5 9/11 Attacks 3,025 2001 U.S.A
20.9 Hurricane Andrew 43 1992 U.S.A
17.31 Northridge Earthquake 60 1994 U.S.A
7.6 Typhoon Mireille 51 1991 Japan
6.44 Winterstorm Daria 95 1990 France, UK et al
6.38 Winterstorm Lothar 110 1999 France, Switzerland et al
6.2 Hurricane Hugo 71 1989 Puerto Rico, U.S.A et al
4.84 Storms and floods 22 1987 France, UK et al
4.48 Winterstorm Vivian 64 1990 Western Europe
4.45 Typhoon Bart 26 1999 Japan
Source: OECD, 2005
Table 2. The 10 most costly insurance losses 1970-2003
Category Index Number Of Observ.
I. Global, European FTSE All World 3054
American and Swiss MSCI Europe 3054
Stock Markets S&P 500 3051
SMI 3054
II. Banks and Financials FTSE Global Banks 2534
FTSE Global Financials 2534
III. Insurance MSCI Europe Insurance 2795
FTSE All World Life Insurance 3054
FTSE All World Non-Life Insurance 3054
IV. Travel and Airlines FTSE All World Travel 3054
MSCI Europe Airlines 2795
V. Defense and Pharmaceutical FTSE All World Aero/Defense 3054
FTSE All World Pharma/Biotech 3054
VI. Oil and Gas FTSE All World Oil/Gas 3054
FTSE Europe Oil/Gas 3054
VII. Commodity Markets GSCI Commodity 3054
GSCI Gold 3054
VIII. Bond Markets J.P. Morgan Global Government Bond Index 3054
FTSE Eurozone Bond Index 1925
FTSE U.S. Government Bond Index 1491
Table 3. Financial Markets Indices. The table shows the list of stock indices considered in the study
and the way they are grouped into eight categories.
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Min. Max. Mean S.D. Skew. Kurt. Jarque-
Bera
FTSE All World -0.0501 0.0466 0.0002 0.0083 -0.17 6.33 1427.59
MSCI Europe -0.0635 0.0556 0.0002 0.0108 -0.26 6.47 1564.10
S&P 500 -0.0711 0.0557 0.0003 0.0107 -0.11 6.74 1776.40
SMI -0.0733 0.0746 0.0003 0.0119 -0.15 7.38 2453.86
FTSE Global Banks -0.0530 0.0707 0.0001 0.0116 0.03 6.14 1040.11
FTSE Global Financials -0.0515 0.0684 0.0002 0.0115 0.13 5.92 903.20
MSCI Europe Insurance -0.1287 0.0998 0.0002 0.0160 -0.33 9.58 5085.01
FTSE All World Life
Insurance -0.0618 0.0826 0.0004 0.0123 0.02 6.58 1630.26
FTSE All World
Non-Life Insurance -0.0610 0.0838 0.0003 0.0120 0.12 7.14 2185.27
FTSE All World Travel -0.1291 0.1279 0.0001 0.0145 -0.23 10.03 6301.54
MSCI Europe Airlines -0.1525 0.0899 0.0000 0.0157 -0.34 9.86 5711.73
FTSE All World Aero/Defense -0.0858 0.0535 0.0003 0.0118 -0.47 7.38 2550.24
FTSE All World Pharma/Biotech -0.0508 0.0595 0.0004 0.0097 -0.11 6.02 1162.56
FTSE All World Oil/Gas -0.0686 0.0479 0.0004 0.0100 -0.32 6.03 1220.37
FTSE Europe Oil/Gas -0.0776 0.0634 0.0004 0.0123 -0.16 5.83 1027.65
GSCI Commodity -0.0915 0.0500 0.0003 0.0122 -0.20 5.25 662.83
GSCI Gold -0.0508 0.0883 0.0000 0.0082 0.74 13.89 15359.69
J.P. Morgan GGBI -0.0174 0.0189 0.0000 0.0039 0.06 4.54 301.77
FTSE Eurozone Bond Index -0.0099 0.0074 0.0000 0.0021 -0.42 4.12 157.17
FTSE U.S. Gov. Bond Index -0.0156 0.0138 0.0000 0.0031 -0.32 4.35 137.75
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Daily Returns on Different Stock Indices from
January 1994 to August 2005. The table shows the descriptive statistics for daily returns on
the stock indices. S.D. denotes standard deviation. Skew. denotes skewness, Kurt. denotes kurtosis.
Jarque-Bera test (Jarque and Bera 1980) is a parametric hypothesis test of normality, equal to a sum
of the standardized skewness and kurtosis. In our case Jarque-Bera test indicates that considered log
transformed returns are not normally distributed. This is also equivalent to violation of the log-normality
assumption of the original returns on index.
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Paper 3
Pricing of Multiple-Event Coupon
Paying CAT Bond
3.1 Introduction
The recent history of natural disasters and terrorist events reveals a changing nature of
these catastrophic events both in terms of their frequency and their magnitude1. Globally,
weather-related disasters occur at over five times the rate that they did 40 years ago.
Economic losses due to natural disasters appear to be doubling every 10 years, and by
the next decade they have been forecast to reach $150 billion per year (Fishel (2005)).
As to terrorism risk, the long-term outlook on this risk remains negative and insurers
with big natural catastrophe cover are looking to terrorism as a new area to underwrite2.
At year-end 2005, nearly two-thirds of businesses in the US had purchased terrorism
risk insurance policies. Real estate firms, financial institutions, health care facilities and
media companies were buyers of this type of coverage (Valverde and Hartwig (2006)).
The anticipated increase of severe storms and weather events associated with climate
1For example, the hurricane Katrina in August 2005 was one of the deadliest natural disasters in U.S. history
with estimated 1,353 direct fatalities, $40.6 billion in insured losses and more than $100 billion in economic losses
(Johnson (2006)). As to terrorist events, the 9/11 attacks led to 2, 976 deaths and inflicted damage currently
estimated at around USD 200 billion with $35.6 billion attributed to insurance claim payments (Valverde and
Hartwig (2006)). Another example is the bombings in Madrid in 2004 that resulted in 191 people killed and
$110.9 million insurance cost (SwissRe (2006)).
2According to Lloyds, London market insurers have been told that the long-term outlook on terrorism is
negative, with attacks likely to diversify away from the transport network to places of public entertainment and
other major cities such as Manchester and Birmingham. Besides the UK, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and France
are most at risk of an attack in Western Europe. Those at risk, but to a lesser degree, include Germany, Belgium,
Denmark and Norway (Lloyd’s (2006)).
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change and on-going threat of terrorist events can place enormous financial demands on
the insurance and reinsurance businesses (Fishel (2005)). As a result, development of the
ways to transfer these catastrophic risks to capital markets has become more important
than ever before. While issuance of risk-linked securities (ILSs) such as catastrophe
bonds (CAT bonds) has played an important role in managing the exposure to the risk
from natural catastrophes, securitization of terrorism risk in a similar way has become
a real challenge. The latter is due to inherent uncertainties associated with terrorism
risk and consequent difficulties in modelling and quantification of this risk. The feedback
from reinsurance industry shows that, if securitized, terrorism risk is still preferred to
be packaged together with other catastrophic risks. From the point of view of investors,
rating agencies and issuing companies themselves, ILSs constructed this way seem to have
a better potential to find its niche on the market.
This study is the first of its kind that focuses on the issue of pricing of a multiple-
event coupon paying CAT bond that covers exposure to catastrophic risks, including
terrorism. Securitization of the latter by means of CAT bonds with a multiple-event and
multiple-risk structure is suggested in some of the literature (see OECD (2005) and Woo
(2004)). However, none of the existing research develops a theoretical model to price such
instruments. This study is the first to address this issue. We implement theoretical pricing
of a multiple-event CAT bond in incomplete market setting using a representative agent
pricing model. In contrast to the existing literature on pricing of standard CAT bonds,
the payoffs on the bond in our model are linked to two types of underlying processes:
catastrophic property losses and catastrophic mortality. Along with natural catastrophes
and man-made disasters, our model views terrorism risk as one of the main exposure risks
that may effect the cash flows of the bond. To capture the impact of terrorist attacks
we focus on daily instead of annual catastrophe mortality. We set attachment levels
that allow us to capture possible levels of terrorism risk causalities. Finally, we use a
multiple-event contingency of the bond’s cash flows that is a preferred choice with respect
to terrorism risk securitization according to the literature (see OECD (2005)). We believe
that this way of structuring the bond allows us to incorporate the impact of terrorist
events in a better way compared to existing risk transfer transactions. For example,
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the Vita Capital catastrophe-indexed notes issued by Swiss Re in 2003 were aimed at
hedging catastrophe mortality risk. The payoffs on the notes were linked to the value of
the annual combined mortality index (the weighted average of annual population death
rates in the US, UK, France, Italy and Switzerland) with such events under coverage as
natural disasters, epidemics, terrorism and wars. The principal of these notes was at risk
if, during any single calendar year in the risk coverage period, the mortality index exceeds
130% of its baseline 2002 level (equivalent to approximately more than 800,000 deaths
according to the Standard and Poor’s report (SP (2003))). In this setting, the impact of
terrorism risk was diluted. Even the 9/11 attacks that resulted in almost 3000 deaths, on
their own, would not be an event significant enough to trigger the cash flow risk of these
notes.
An important contribution of this work is that it provides a numerical evaluation of
the price of the bond under consideration. We implement a Monte Carlo simulation of
the price using the UK catastrophe data provided by Swiss Re. We assume that both, the
bond’s coupons and its principal are at risk if the triggering events occur. We consider
different cases/scenarious for which we compute corresponding prices of coupon-bearing
and zero-coupon CAT bonds. The scenarios considered here include a possibility of events
of the magnitude of the 9/11 attacks and higher as it can be in the case of chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear terrorist incidents.
The results of this study indicate that the price of the bond increases with threshold
levels and decreases with stronger positive dependence between losses and deaths. As to
time to maturity, there is an inverse relationship between the price of the bond and its
time to expiration. Although this relationship always works for a zero-coupon catastrophe
bond, it may not always hold when the bond pays coupons. In general, we find a less
responsive behavior of the bond’s price to changes in dependence between losses and
deaths than to changes in the bond’s time to maturity. In addition, we see that for
a coupon paying CAT bond the impact of increase in attachment levels on the bond’s
price dominates the effect of extended maturity. The opposite result is observed for a
zero-coupon CAT bond.
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3.2 Related Research
When implementing our model we benefit from existing literature that can be grouped
into several strands of research. The first strand of research describes pricing of standard
CAT bonds. This group of literature is the most closely related to our paper. For
example, Louberge, Kellezi, and Gilli (1999) numerically estimate the CAT bond price
assuming Poisson and lognormal distributions for frequency and severity of catastrophe
losses correspondingly, and binomial random process for interest rates. The paper by Lee
and Yu (2002) describes a pricing model of default-risky CAT bond, accounting for moral
hazard and basis risk3. The authors adopt the approach of Duan, Moreau, and Sealey
(1995) to describe insurer’s total asset value as consisting of two risk components: interest
rate and credit risks. They assume the square-root process of Cox for the dynamics of
interest rate and a compound Poisson process for the aggregate loss dynamics.
When pricing catastrophic risks, the market incompleteness is an important issue to
be addressed. Cox and Pedersen (2000) propose a framework of pricing CAT bonds
in the incomplete market setting. They capture this issue using a representative agent
technique. Another possible approach to address incompleteness is by means of the so
called Wang transform (Wang (2004)). This approach is used in the study by Lin and Cox
(2006). The authors consider securitization of catastrophic mortality risk and use the Vita
Capital transaction of Swiss Re as an example when developing the framework of their
model. When modelling stochastic mortality behavior, they assume the Brownian motion
dynamics for the unanticipated ‘normal’ mortality index change and a jump process for
‘abnormal’ mortality shocks.
Papers by Dahl (2004), Cairns, Blake, and Dowd (2004), Lin and Cox (2005) focus on
non-catastrophe mortality risk and describe different pricing frameworks for securitization
of this risk. Burnecki (2005) considers pricing of CAT bonds using a compound non-
homogeneous Poisson model with left truncated loss distribution. The author considers
3The basis risk is the risk of the gap between the insurer’s actual loss and the composite index of losses that
prevent the insurer from receiving complete risk hedging. The basis risk may cause the default of insurer in case
of high individual loss and therefore this risk affects the bond’s price. The moral hazard problem arises when
the insurer’s cost of loss control efforts exceeds the benefits of debt forgiveness. Consequently, it may increase
the claim payments at the expense of the bondholders coupon and principal reduction and affect the bond price.
There is a tradeoff between these two problems. For example, if the parametric index is used to define the CAT
bond payments then the moral hazard problem is reduced while the basis risk is created (Lee and Yu (2002)).
96
losses resulting from natural catastrophic events in the U.S.
Finally, Barrieu and Louberge (2007) analyze the effect of hybrid CAT bonds on the
volume of capital flowing into the CAT bond market. Hybrid CAT bonds combine the
transfer of catastrophic risk with protection against a stock market crash. The paper
shows that replacing standard CAT bonds with hybrid CAT bonds would lead to increase
in market volume, in particular when investors are strongly risk averse, compared to
issuers of CAT bonds (insurers, reinsurers and large corporations).
Only few articles focus on pricing of catastrophe-linked securities other than CAT
bonds. For example, Cummins and Geman (1995) and Chang, J.Chang, and M.Yu (1996)
consider pricing of CAT futures and CAT call spreads. Another paper, by Aase (2001)
presents a valuation framework, a Markov model, of futures contracts and derivatives on
such contracts. Litzenberger, Beaglehole, and Reynolds (1996) explore approaches to the
valuation, pricing and assessment of CAT options.
Alternative risk transfer instruments such as catastrophe-linked securities both exchange-
traded and OTC are usually considered a good supplement to a more traditional approach
of dealing with catastrophic risk, namely reinsurance. The paper by Jaffee and Rus-
sell (1997) discusses different aspects of catastrophe insurance covering private insurance
market, reinsurance and ILSs. A study by Gibson, Habib, and Ziegler (2006) compares
exchange-traded catastrophe instruments and reinsurance. The authors try to under-
stand the reasons behind the failure of exchange-traded catastrophe securities given high
capacity and liquidity of financial markets. They propose a model that describes the
insurer’s problem of choosing between reinsurance and transferring catastrophic risk to
financial market. They do this by comparing the expected payoff of both options. The
authors refer to relative success of the OTC catastrophe instruments compared to their
exchange-traded counterparts. Transactions of the former type of securities have been
in the form of private placements and with a small number of qualified investors. This
limits the presence of noise traders. They conclude that catastrophic risk has to be better
understood if buyers are not restricted only to a small group of institutional investors.
Hardle and Cabrera (2007) examine calibration of a parametric CAT bond for Mexican
earthquakes. The authors refer to a mix of reinsurance and a CAT bond as a better and
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cheaper coverage for a ceding company (government in this case) compared to reinsurance
itself. Finally, catastrophe insurance issues are also examined in the paper by Chakravarty
and Kelsey (2006). This papers explains an ‘Act of God Clause’ that is present in many
insurance and incentive contracts by ambiguity-aversion.
The second strand of the literature focuses on the conceptual issues of terrorism risk
securitization. Woo (2004) refers to risk ambiguity, moral hazard and basis risk as major
concerns when implementing terrorism risk securitization. At the same time, he sees
multiple-event-risk transactions as a good way of transferring terrorism risk to capital
markets and gaining confidence of both investors and rating agencies. He refers to a
workers’ compensation bond that may cover, for example, Los Angeles earthquake and
terrorism, but causes loss of principal only if a second event occurred4.
The idea of terrorism CAT bond has been initially suggested by Kunreuther (2002).
Since then it had been developed in many other studies (see OECD (2005), Nell and
Richter (2004), CTRMP (2006)). Besides the idea of terrorism CAT bonds, the concept
of ‘terrorism futures’ market is discussed in literature (see Ray (2003) and Hanson (2005)).
It relates to the controversial idea of prediction markets (see Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2003),
Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004)) that serve as aggregators of relevant information to fore-
cast, for example, election outcomes, project completion dates, gas demands etc. The
main concern about ‘terrorism futures’ relates to a possible speculative trading through
Internet accounts and incentives for terrorists to commit acts of terror. Despite negative
public reaction, a recent paper by Hanson (2005) gives a more favorable view of the ‘ter-
rorism futures’ and provides a detailed description of possible design issues/concerns with
implementing and using these instruments. These are combinatorics (possible terrorist at-
tack scenarios), manipulation (‘bad’ guys might manipulate prices, ‘noise’ trading), moral
hazard (‘bad’ guys benefit on trading), hiding pricing (alarming the public with terrorism
threat and revealing public awareness of this threat to terrorists), and decision selection
bias (a misleading impression of what speculators know about decision-contingent esti-
4The issue of terrorism risk for workers’ compensation insurance in the U.S. is particularly severe because
almost all states require terrorism risk to be covered in every workers’ compensation policy (OECD (2005)).
Workers’ compensation insurers are obliged to pay wage loss and medical benefits to workers injured on the job
without regard to cause and without loss limit. Terrorism and reinsurance experts have conceived of plausible
catastrophic terrorist events that generate workers’ compensation loss of 90 bn USD or more (Journal (2004)).
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mates when decision makers know more than speculators). The author concludes that
none of the above mentioned concerns seem unsolvable. According to Hanson (2005)
‘Where there is a political will to purchase this concept, ‘terrorism futures’ have a rea-
sonable chance of helping us to deal with terrorism’.
The third strand of literature focuses on the possible ways to quantify and model
terrorism risk. Woo (2002) discusses several challenges associated with terrorism risk
modelling. The author refers to the difficulties in predicting terrorist hazard (frequency
of attacks) and their vulnerability (loss inflicted given a particular scenario of terrorist
event). He focuses on strategic aspects of terrorism risk and possible architecture of
terrorist networks (swarm intelligence). The author suggests an event-tree approach for
estimation the success of planned attacks. Some literature focuses on application of the
game theory in modelling of terrorism risk (see Woo (2002), Reactions (2002)). Given
that this risk reflects rational planning and human intent, this theory can be a powerful
tool to capture the human element of terrorist attacks. In his article, Major (2002) shows
a possible application of the game theory to develop a probability distribution of losses5.
Finally, some studies suggest hidden Markov models for implementing stochastic mod-
elling of terrorist attacks. For example, according to Woo (2003), the Markovian concept
of a system state is considered to be well suited to the fluctuating dynamics of the ter-
rorism phenomenon, with the need to periodically update the threat situation. Singh,
Allanach, Pattipati, and Willett (2004) propose the Adaptive Safety Analysis and Moni-
toring (ASAM) system that allows to implement counter-terrorism analysis using hidden
Markov models and Bayesian networks. The authors illustrate the way the ASAM system
works for two hypothetical models of terrorist activities at the Athens 2004 Olympics.
3.3 Securitization of Catastrophic Risks
While issuance of risk-linked securities such as CAT bonds and CAT futures has played an
important part in securitization of the risk of natural disasters, terrorism risk transfer in
a similar way has become a real challenge. Given that securitization in relation to natural
5Another alternative way to calculate the probabilities, the Delphi method, is used in the true probabilistic
model developed by the Applied Insurance Research (Reactions (2002)).
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catastrophes is well described in the literature (see Louberge, Kellezi, and Gilli (1999),
Litzenberger, Beaglehole, and Reynolds (1996), Dubinsky and Laster (2004) and Jaffee
and Russell (1997)), below we discuss conceptual issues of terrorism risk securitization
only.
Terrorism risk is embodied within a worker’s compensation risk, mortality risk, com-
mercial/industrial property and business interruption risk, and event cancellation risk.
The drastic reduction in terrorism risk (re)insurance cover after the 9/11 attacks has
given a rise to a search for alternative risk transfer mechanisms.
There were two transactions that involved securitization of terrorism-related losses:
the FIFA transaction, Golden Goal Finance Ltd., initiated by the FIFA governing body
in September 2003 and the Vita Capital transaction implemented by Swiss Re in De-
cember 2003. In the first case, the CAT bond was aimed at covering revenue losses that
would arise in the event of cancelation of the 18th FIFA World Cup scheduled to be held
in the summer of 2006 in Germany. This transaction transferred the risk of the sport-
ing event being canceled due to natural/ man-made catastrophes and terrorist events
(OECD (2005)). In the second case, the extreme mortality risk was hedged against by
means of the catastrophe-indexed notes. These instruments were linked to a rise in the
constructed annual mortality index from natural disasters, epidemics, war and terrorist
attacks (Brauner and Galey (2003)). While terrorism risk in these transactions was not
the main risk under coverage, the over-subscription for these instruments demonstrated
that investors were prepared to buy bonds with default tied to some level of this risk.
According to the OECD (2005), securitization of terrorism risk by means of CAT bonds
with multiple-event and multiple-risk structure6 appears to be an important condition of
success: future securitization might try to mix-and-match different risks in order to dilute
the terrorism component and to make the loss of principal contingent on the occurrence
of two or more triggering events. While these financial instruments possess characteristics
of standard CAT bonds, they also offer some other advantages because of their multiple-
6There have been some experience of multiple-event securitization in the area of natural catastrophes. For
example, Phoenix Quake Wind covered second event Japanese earthquake and typhoon. It was issued on behalf of
Zenkyoren, the Japanese National Mutual Insurance Federation of Agricultural Cooperatives. This securitization
was rated Baa3 by Moodys, and BBB+ by S&P. The annual expected loss of this bond was 22 basis points. The
coupon spread above LIBOR was 245 basis points. For more examples see Woo (2004).
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event structure.
First, a multiple-event CAT bond is less likely to experience losses since it would re-
quire several and separate triggering events to occur before investors lose the principal.
Second, the probability that several triggering events would occur is often less than that
of one triggering event and such a multiple-event structure may reduce concerns about re-
liability of estimates for separate events. In other words, multiple-event contingency helps
to mitigate the ambiguity that surrounds the risk of a single event. This consequently
would result in a higher chance for a bond having obtained an investment-grade rating
that would increase the number of institutional investors who would purchase this instru-
ment, making securitization more viable7. Third, if one of the triggering events occurred,
there would be time for the bond to be traded or to be put on watch list by a rating
agency. Fourth, since the sequence of several triggering events may negatively affect an
insurance company’s credit rating and make the company insolvent, the multiple-event
bond can provide protection against such contingency. It should be noted that although
conceptually discussed, multiple-event CAT bonds have not been developed much. This
paper is the first one to address this issue from a theoretical and numerical point of view.
To conclude, companies that decide to issue multiple-event CAT bonds would trans-
fer catastrophic risks to the capital market and, as a result, may need to purchase less
reinsurance8 or, alternatively, to hold less capital to cover extreme losses. Among possi-
ble issuing companies are institutions that are the most exposed to these risks, namely,
insurance and reinsurance businesses. In addition, governments, energy companies and
oil producers may find these instruments attractive. For example, a multiple-event CAT
bond that covers the risk of quakes and terrorist events in Mexico can be developed. Given
that this country is one of the biggest oil producers and its exposure to earthquakes and
terrorist events, the issuance of such bond may interest the government, oil companies
and reinsurance businesses9.
7For example, Moody’s investment grade rating of FIFA transaction facilitated successful placement of the
issue to the capital markets (Woo (2004)).
8Compared to reinsurance, CAT bonds can offer attractive pricing over multi-year term, systematic claim
recovery, and in some cases, greater material security in the form of lower counterparty credit risk (Dubinsky and
Laster (2004)).
9Terrorism risk in Mexico is related to the US-Mexico cross-borders (on the land and in the air), presence of
foreign terrorism and criminal organizations.
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3.3.1 Securitization Framework
The simple structure of a securitization procedure via the CAT bond is presented in the
Figure 1 in Appendix A. The hedger/sponsor/ceding company (for example, an insurance
company) pays a premium in exchange for a pre-specified coverage if a catastrophic event
of a certain magnitude takes place and investors purchase a bond for cash. The total
amount, premium and cash proceeds, are directed to a tailor-made fund, called a special-
purpose vehicle company (SPV)10, which issues the bond to investors (large institutional
buyers11) and invests bond’s proceeds (less transaction costs) in high quality securities
portfolio, with low interest rate sensitivity. The securities portfolio is placed in a trust
account as collateral for the debt service payments due on the bond. The SPV also engages
into a fixed-floating interest rate swap that converts the interest returns on the portfolio
into LIBOR based floating rate payments. Investors receive a relatively high spread above
the LIBOR rate to compensate for the catastrophic risk exposure. Investors’ cash flows
namely coupons and/or principal are contingent on the catastrophe occurrence. In other
words, a CAT bond functions like a fully collaterized multi-year reinsurance contract.
3.3.2 Diversification Issue
Standard CAT bonds provide attractive returns and portfolio risk diversification benefits
for investors. The diversification argument relies on the fact that catastrophic risks are
not or low correlated with market returns. If terrorism risk is among other catastrophic
risk under coverage, diversification benefits of holding a CAT bond have to be revised.
Empirical evidence about the impact of terrorist attacks on the behavior of different
financial markets shows both negative and positive reactions to these events (see results
of the second paper of this thesis as well as papers by Chen and Siembs (2004), Johnston
and Nedelescu (2005), Eldor and Melnick (2004) Carter and Simkins (2001), Karolyi and
Martell (2005), Glaser and Weber (2004), Enders and Sandler (1991)). According to the
existing research such industry sectors as insurance, airlines and travel/tourism exhibit
10The SPV is typically structured as a Cayman Islands or Bermuda exempt company whose common shares
are held by a charitable trust. This structure shelters the SPV from a potential bankruptcy, and resembles the
approach often adopted in asset-backed securitization. (Dubinsky and Laster (2004))
11To date, the majority of CAT bonds have been sold to investors pursuant to Rule 144A.
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negative reaction to terrorist events. In contrast, the results of the second paper of this
thesis show that aero/defense, pharma/biotech and oil/gas sectors may show a significant
positive reaction. In addition, government bonds and the commodity/gold indices that
are traditionally considered as ‘safe-haven’ investments, may also benefit from unsettling
news about terrorist events.
In terms of the strength of the impact, terrorist attacks display a short-term rather
than a long-term effect on the markets’ behavior (see second paper of this thesis and
paper by Chen and Siembs (2004)). Consequently, because of the markets’ resilience to
terrorist attacks, returns on the investor’s portfolio can recover fast.
If investors prefer strongly diversified portfolios and hold financial assets with returns
that are positively correlated with the risk of terrorism (commodities, US government
bonds, defense and pharma/biotech stocks) then possible losses on the CAT bond due
to this risk may be offset by the gains on other assets. However, if among other assets
are insurance, airline and travel/tourism stocks, then terrorist events will have a more
pronounced negative effect on the portfolio performance.
3.4 The Model
The multiple-event CAT bond we are interested in, covers exposure to natural catastro-
phes and man-made disasters, including terrorism. From the prospective of insurer, these
events can affect multiple lines of insurance such as life, commercial/industrial property,
workers’ compensation, accident and health. In this study, we focus on catastrophic prop-
erty losses and on catastrophic mortality. The cash flows of the bond are linked to two
types of triggering events (see Figure 2). The first type of event is associated with either
catastrophic property damage or catastrophic mortality that is above a corresponding
attachment level. The second type of event is when both catastrophic property losses and
deaths are above their respective attachment levels. The CAT bond is a coupon-paying
instrument. Investors lose their coupon payments when one of the two triggering events
happens. The principal is fully at risk if both triggering events occur.
We use indemnity trigger for property losses, which involves direct property losses of
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the ceding party due to catastrophic events. In indemnity deals, there is no basis risk.
At the same time, there is a potential of a moral hazard problem. This is because the
issuing party may have an incentive to settle claims more generously when losses approach
the attachment level. We assume that evaluation of the incurred catastrophe property
losses and the number of deaths respectively is implemented by outside institutions such
as the ISO’s Property Claim Services12 and the Office of National Statistics13. Finally, we
make a simplifying assumption that both the amount of property losses and the number
of deaths are available at the end of the day of occurrence of a catastrophic event.
3.4.1 Assumptions
• We consider a coupon paying bond with maturity T years. The face value of the
bond is F and coupon payments Ct are paid annually at times t = 1, 2, . . . ,T. In
case of catastrophe events, both, coupons and the principal are at risk.
• The potential total daily loss amounts IL = (ILt )0≤t≤T are non-negative random
variables that follow some distribution FL. The aggregate property loss process up
to time t is given as IALt =
∑t
i=0 I
L
i , t ∈ [0,T].
• The potential number of deaths per day ID = (IDt )0≤t≤T are random variables follow
some distribution FD.
• The daily property losses ILt and daily deaths IDt may be dependent. We denote the
dependence coefficient as τLD.
• The attachment point for property losses is given as a threshold total annual loss
amount. The initial value of the attachment point is set at time t = 0 and equal
to LAP . The initial value has to be changed at the beginning of each year during
the life of the bond (losses are accumulated on daily basis over the whole life of the
bond): ILAPt =
∑t−1
i=0 I
L
i + L
AP , t = 1, 2, . . . ,T, where ILAPt is the value of attachment
point set for year t.
12ISO’s Property Claim Services (PCS) unit is the internationally recognized authority on insured property
losses from catastrophes. Check www.iso.com for more details. There is another institution called AIR. See
www.air-worldwide.com.
13See www.statistics.gov.uk for UK, www.cdc.gov/nchs/ for US, www.bfs.admin.ch for Switzerland.
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• The attachment point for deaths is defined as a threshold number of deaths per day
IDAP . It stays at this level for the whole life of the bond.
• Triggering events are defined in terms of the following threshold times:
τ1 = inf{t > 0 : IALt > ILAPs}, where s=[t]+1 if t < T and s=T if t=T.
τ2 = inf{t > 0 : IDt > IDAP},
τ3 = min{τ1, τ2},
τ4 = max{τ1, τ2}.
• One-period interest rates are {r(k) | k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T − 1}.
3.4.2 Pricing Framework
Pricing of derivative securities in complete market setting involves replicating portfolios.
This way of pricing, however, does not work for the multiple-event CAT bond under
our consideration. The bond derives its value based on the level of annual aggregate
catastrophe property losses and daily catastrophe mortality, but we have no efficiently
traded mortality and catastrophic loss indices with which to create a replicating hedge.
Situations like this implies incompleteness of the market. In this study, we handle market
incompleteness (existence of many equivalent martingale probability measures) by means
of the representative agent pricing model (see Huang and R.Litzenberger (1988), Karatzas
(1997)).
We assume that financial market variables are modelled on the filtered probability
space (Ω(1),P(1),P1). The relevant financial market variables when valuing CAT bonds
are, for example, the term structure of interest rates. The catastrophic risk variables are
modelled on the filtered probability space (Ω(2),P(2),P2). The probability measure P2
is a physical probability measure governing catastrophe events. The probability space
for the full model is given as (Ω,P,P), where Ω := Ω(1) × Ω(2); Pk = P(1)k ×P(2)k
for k = 0, 1, . . . , T ; P(ω) = P1(ω(1))P2(ω(2)), where ω = (ω(1), ω(2)) is a generic state of
the world describing the state of the financial market variables and the catastrophic risk
variables. It should be noted that this setting implies independence of events that depend
only on economic risk variables and those that depend only on catastrophic risk variables.
The cash flows to the bondholder can be described in the following way:
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CF (k) =
 CIτ3>k k = 1, 2, . . . ,T-1;CIτ3>k + FIτ4>k k = T.
To price this stream of cash flows in the incomplete market we apply the representative
agent pricing model (RAPM). According to this model, the price Pn(CF ) of a generic
future cash flow process CF = {CF (k) | k = 1, 2, . . . , T} at time 0 is given by the
expectation
P0(CF ) = EP
[
T∑
k=1
u′k(C
∗(ω, k))
u′0(C∗(0))
CF (k)
]
, (3.1)
where uk(C
∗(ω, k)) is the utility of the amount of the consumption good endowed to the
entire economy in state ω at time k. Note that the form of the utility function and
the aggregate consumption C∗(w, k) is removed from the pricing analysis later on. This
is done by relating the representative agent valuation formula to the valuation measure
approach of arbitrage-free pricing.
The one-period interest rates are defined as
1
1 + r(k)
:=
1
u′k(C∗(ω, k))
EP[u
′
k+1(C
∗(ω, k + 1)) |Pk], (3.2)
for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T − 1 (see Appendix C).
Under the assumptions of the RAPM, the price can be equivalently obtained as a
discounted expectation under the probability measure Q:
P0(CF ) = EQ
[
T∑
k=1
1
[1 + r(0)][1 + r(1)] . . . [1 + r(k − 1)]CF (k)
]
, (3.3)
where the Radon-Nikodym derivative for all information over [0, T ] is given as
dQ
dP
|PT (ω) := [1 + r(0)][1 + r(ω, 1)] . . . [1 + r(ω, T − 1)]
u′T (C
∗(ω, T ))
u′0(C∗(ω, 0))
. (3.4)
A detailed explanation about the change of measure, covering the proof that the process
ζ(T ) = dQ
dP |PT is a P-martingale on the filtration P, can be found in Cox and Pedersen
(2000). Equivalence of formulas (3.1) and (3.3) implies that the knowledge of one-period
interest rates and the risk-neutral valuation measure Q is equivalent to knowledge of the
representative investor’s utility function and the aggregate consumption process.
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We assume that the aggregate consumption depends only on the financial risk variables.
This implies that the Radon-Nikodym derivative in (3.4) also depends only on financial
risk variables. Under the valuation measure Q those events that depend only on financial
risk variables are independent of those events that depend only on catastrophic risk vari-
ables. Assuming that cash flows CF (k) on CAT bond depend only on the catastrophic
risk variables, this has important implication on the pricing of such bond:
P0(CF ) =
T∑
k=1
P (0, k)EP[CF (k)] =
T∑
k=1
P (0, k)EP2 [CF (k)], (3.5)
where
P (0, k) = EQ
[
1
[1 + r(0)][1 + r(1)] . . . [1 + r(k − 1)]
]
(3.6)
stands for a price at time t=0 of a non-defaultable zero-coupon bond with face value 1
maturing at time k (see Appendix D for more details about this result). The price of the
bond at time t = 0 is given by
PB0 (CF ) =
∑
t∈{1,...,T}
CP (0, t)EP2 [Iτ3>t] + FP (0, T )EP2 [Iτ4>T ]. (3.7)
We simplified this formula (see Appendix E) to
PB0 (CF ) =
∑
t∈{1,...,T}
CP (0, t)P2
[
t∑
i=0
ILi ≤ ILAPt , sup{0≤j≤t} I
D
j ≤ IDAP
]
+
FP (0, T )[1− P2(τ1 ≤ τ2 | τ2 ≤ T )P2(τ2 ≤ T )− P2(τ2 ≤ τ1 | τ1 ≤ T )P2(τ1 ≤ T )].
We do not expect a close-form solution for such a complex contingent security and
thus we estimate the price of the bond numerically.
3.4.3 Numerical Analysis
This section estimates the price of a multiple-event CAT bond using historical data on the
UK catastrophe property losses and deaths provided by Swiss Re (see Table 1 in Appendix
B). The UK was exposed to the risk of natural catastrophes and terrorist events in the
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past14. According to experts’ forecast, exposure of the UK to these catastrophe events
will not diminish in the future. Therefore transferring catastrophe risks to capital markets
by means of CAT bonds can be an attractive securitization strategy for insurance and
reinsurance in this country.
Data Calibration
The data cover daily property losses and deaths due to natural and man-maid disasters
that occurred between 1970 and 2005 (see Figures 3-4 in Appendix A). In order to cali-
brate our model we have to estimate a distribution of the time of occurrence of catastrophe
events as well as a joint distribution of catastrophe property losses and deaths.
Time of occurrence of catastrophic events
When implementing modelling of the time of occurrence of catastrophe events we look
at their inter-arrival times. We see that data exhibit autocorrelation and are not random
(see Figure 5 (a) in and a corresponding value of the Ljung-Box test of randomness).
We implement a log-transformation of the inter-arrival times and see that data become
random (see Figure 5 (b)-(d)). Next, we graphically examine the data transformed. We
see that data are asymmetrical and have heavy tails (see Figure 6). To capture these
characteristics, we consider a skewed student’s t-distribution (with parameters η and λ as
it is described in Hansen (1994)) as a possible analytical distribution of the normalized
log-transformed inter-arrival times. We estimate parameters of this distribution using the
MLE technique and check the adequacy of the fit graphically and based on non-parametric
tests. Our analysis confirms that a skewed student’s t distribution with η = 10.7176,
λ = −0.3380 describes the log-transformed data well both based on the graphical exam-
ination (see Figures 7-8) and according to the test statistics (the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
14Hurricane force winds in Oct. 1987 caused extensive damage of 1, 957m GBP. Storms and flooding in January-
February 1990 resulted in 3, 158m GBP. Catastrophic ”extreme rainfall events” in summer 2007 left more than
a third of a million people without drinking water, nearly 50,000 people without power, thousands more people
homeless and caused more than 2bn GBP worth of damage (McCarthy (2007)). As to exposure to terrorism risk,
London bombings on 7th of July, 2005 caused 56 deaths, about 700 people injured, and 51.5 m USD in insured
property loss. Among more recent events in London were two car bombs that were discovered and disabled before
they could be detonated on the 29th of June, 2007 .
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test statistics at the 1% significance level is 0.05 and p-value is 0.97). Finally, we check
the goodness of fit by comparing empirical inter-arrival times with simulated inter-arrival
times (see Figure 9) and see that the fit is adequate (the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test sta-
tistics at the 1% significance level is 0.04 and p-value is 0.98).
Marginal Distributions of Catastrophe Deaths and Losses
We consider the data on deaths and losses at times of occurrence of events. The data
include zero values in the cases when a catastrophe event has caused either property losses
or deaths. To capture the presence of zeros, we model margins using a distribution of the
following form:
f(x) =
 δ0 with probability (1− w);f ∗(x) with probability w,
where δ0 is a Dirac distribution, f
∗(x) describes the distribution of non-zero values and
w is a percentage of such values. We define f ∗(x) = f ∗D(x) and f
∗(x) = f ∗L(x) as density
functions of deaths and losses correspondingly.
We consider Poisson and Negative Binomial distributions as possible candidates to
describe f ∗D(x) (see Figure 10 (a)). While the Poisson distribution does not fit the data
well15, the Negative Binomial distribution with parameters r = 0.82 p = 0.03 passes
all the tests (the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics at the 1% significance level is 0.08
and p-value is 0.84, for graphical examination see Figure 10 (b)). Next, we check how
well the proposed distribution f(x) with f ∗D(x) ∼ NB(0.82, 0.03) describes the data on
catastrophe deaths. We see that graphically (Figure 11) and based on the test statistics
(the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistics at the 1% significance level is 0.04 and p-value
is 0.99) the fit is adequate.
In the case of losses, we find that the Skew-Normal distribution with a location pa-
rameter ξ = 3.4342, a scale parameter ω = 1.7197 and a shape parameter α = 2.9088
provides a good fit to the log-transformed non-zero losses16 (the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
15The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test at the 1% significance level is 0.51 and p-value is 0.00.
16We also check the Lognormal and Pareto distributions as possible candidates to describe the data on losses.
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statistics at the 1% significance level is 0.08 and p-value is 0.54, for a graphical exami-
nation see Figure 12 ). Finally, we analyze the adequacy of the fit of f(x) with f ∗L(x) ∼
SN(3.4342, 1.7197, 2.9088) to the data on catastrophe property losses. We find that graph-
ically (see Figure 13) as well as based on the test statistics (the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
statistics at the 1% significance level is 0.05 and p-value is 0.90.) the fit is good.
Joint Distribution of Catastrophe Deaths and Losses
To model a joint distribution of losses and deaths, we apply a concept of copula (see
Nelsen (1999), Joe (1997), Mendes (2004), Malevergne and Sornette (2001), Cherubini and
Luciano (2001)). To assure uniqueness of a copula and appropriateness of concordance
measures for a copula’s calibration, we use continued versions of the data as it is suggested
in Denuit and Lambert (2005). We look at Archimedian class of copulas and use the
Kendall’s tau dependence measure17. A preliminary examination of dependence by means
of a scatter plot shows that losses and deaths exhibit a low dependence (see Figure 14).
Note that the dependence affects the probability of the bond’s default and, therefore,
its price. When calibrating parameters of different copulas, we rely on the relationship
between a copula parameter θ and computed value of the Kendall’s tau: τLD = −0.1654,
θC = −0.2838 for the Clayton copula and θF = −1.5221 for the Frank copula18. We check
the fit of selected copulas to the data non-parametrically, using a concept of cardinality.
In other words, we compare Archimedian copulas under consideration with their empirical
equivalent. The copula fit test is performed using the algorithm presented in Genest and
Rivest (1993). We look at a random variable V = F (IL, ID) with a joint distribution
However, these distributions do not pass the goodness of fit tests. The Anderson-Darling test at 1% significance
level for Lognormal distribution gives a p-value of 0.0001. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test at the same significance
level for Pareto distribution is 0.16, p-value is 0.02.
17Kendall’s tau is defined as the probability of concordance minus the probability of discordance for the pairs
of iid random vectors (?):
ρτ (X1,X2) = P ((X1 − X˜1)(X2 − X˜2) > 0)− P ((X1 − X˜1)(X2 − X˜2) < 0).
18We do not use the Gumbel copula because it requires τ > 0.
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function K(v). For Archimedian copulas,
K(v) = v − φθ(v)
φ′θ(v)
,
where φθ(v) is a generator of a copula. The empirical joint distribution function KN(v)
is computed as
KN(v) =
Σiδ(v − Zi)
N
,
where δ is a Dirac function and Zi is defined as
Zi =
]{(ILj , IDj ) : ILj < ILi , IDj < ILi }
N − 1 ,
with ] standing for a cardinality of the set {·}.
A graphical examination of the fit (see Figure 15-16) as well as the analysis of mean-
square errors shows that the Clayton copula19 provides a better fit to the data than
the Frank copula (the corresponding mean square errors are 0.009 for the Clayton and
0.0022 for the Frank copulas). Although historical data exhibit low negative dependence
between losses and deaths, the Clayton copula, in general, allows to generate data with a
positive dependence as well. We use this property when modelling positively dependent
catastrophe property losses and deaths in our scenario analysis. To conclude, the joint
distribution of catastrophe property losses and deaths described by the Clayton copula is
given as
Pr(ID ≤ x, IL ≤ y) = C(u1, u2) =
(
u−θC1 + u
−θC
2 − 1
)−1/θC
, (3.8)
where u1 = F
D, u2 = F
L and θC = −0.2838.
Dynamics of the CAT Bond Price
We assume that the bond has a maturity of 3 years, pays annual coupon rates of 300 bps
over a three-month LIBOR of 6% and has a principal of 100 USD. We set a one-period
interest rate r to be equivalent to the LIBOR rate and assume that it stays constant during
the life of the bond. We choose attachment points based on the values of 80% quantiles of
the distribution of historical catastrophe deaths and annual property losses respectively:
19The generator function of the Clayton copula is given as φθC (v) =
1
θC
(
v−θC − 1).
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IDAP = 48 and LAP = 1362.70 m. USD. This set of parameters corresponds to our base
case. In addition, we implement sensitivity analysis of the bond’s price to different values
of attachment levels, dependence and time to maturity. Finally, we compute the price of
a zero-coupon CAT bond in each case.
We implement 1000 Monte Carlo simulations and obtain the following results (see
Table 2 in Appendix B). In the base case (Case I), the price of the coupon paying multiple-
event CAT bond is 98.57 USD. As expected, in all cases considered, a price of zero-coupon
CAT bond is smaller than a corresponding price of a coupon paying CAT bond. We
analyze the sensitivity of a bond’s price to the time to maturity. We find an inverse
relationship between price of the bond and its time to expiration (Case II and III). A
possible explanation of this result may relate to the fact that over a shorter period of
time, the probability that catastrophe event would cause property losses and deaths above
their attachment points is lower than over a longer period of time. This implies a smaller
probability of the bond’s default and, therefore, a higher price. However, this relationship
may not always work for coupon paying CAT bonds if their maturities are extended
(Catastrophe Event A, Table 3). This is because investors get more coupons over a longer
period of time and unless a triggering event occurs, this consequently results in the increase
of the bond price. This effect is especially pronounced in the case of high attachment
levels that lead to reduction in the probability of losing cash flows on the bond and its
higher price (Case VII). A high level of positive dependence between catastrophe losses
and deaths increases the probability of reaching the attachment levels and therefore the
probability of a bond’s default. Thus, by increasing the dependence we expect the price
of the bond to decrease. We confirm this numerically in the Case IV. When dependence
is increased to 0.80, a smaller price (compared to the base case) of 97.07 USD is obtained.
Note, that in the base case, historical data exhibit the Kendall’s tau dependence of −0.16.
This negative dependence can be explained by the fact that catastrophic events often cause
either property losses or deaths and few events result in both types of casualties.
Next, we evaluate the price of the CAT bond assuming possible independence of
catastrophe losses and deaths (Case V). Computed results confirm our finding that a price
of the bond decreases (increases) as a positive (negative) dependence between catastrophe
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losses and deaths gets stronger. Comparison of CAT bond prices in the Case III and IV
shows that the price is more sensitive to changes in the time to maturity than to changes
in the level of dependence. In both cases, the price is expected to fall due to increased
probability of default. However, the decrease is more pronounced in the case of extended
maturity.
Next, we analyze the reaction of the bond’s price to increases in attachment (threshold)
levels. In Case VI, we change attachment levels to the values of 99% quantiles of the
distribution of historical catastrophe deaths and annual property losses respectively. As
expected, we observe increase in the price of the bond. This is because higher attachment
points imply a lower probability of default and therefore a higher price. Case VII looks
at the bond’s price when, in addition to increased thresholds, the time to maturity is
extended to 4 years. This case is interesting since on the one hand high threshold levels
drive the price up (lower probability of default) and on the other hand longer time to
maturity pushes the price down (higher probability of default). We see that for a coupon
paying CAT bond the impact of increase in attachment levels dominates the effect of
extended maturity. As a result, the price of coupon-paying CAT bond in the Case VII
is higher than in the Case VI (108.90 USD versus 107.03 USD). The opposite effect is
observed for a zero-coupon CAT bond, which price declines from 83.96 USD to 79.21
USD.
In addition, we evaluate the price of the bond for a scenario of extreme events of
the magnitude of the 9/11 attacks (Catastrophe Event A in Table 3) and higher, as it
can be in the case of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism incidents20
(Catastrophe Event B in Table 3). Note that the level of property losses due to the 9/11
attacks is close to the property damage of 40 bn USD predicted due to possible flooding in
the UK because of the climate change21 (see ABI (2005)). Estimated price of the coupon
paying CAT bond in the case of Catastrophe Event A reaches 108.02 USD. As expected,
this price is higher than in the base case because of the reduced probability of the bond’s
default. Note that price stays at the same level when dependence is increased to 0.80.
20The calibration of a threshold level for property losses for this event is implemented using the forecast by
Insurance Information Institute for major US cities (see Valverde and Hartwig (2006))
21The 9/11 attacks resulted in almost 3000 deaths and 35.6 bn USD in insured loss.
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However, it increases for a coupon paying CAT bond and decreases for a zero-coupon
CAT bond when, in addition, the maturity is extended to 4 years. This result confirms a
more responsive behavior of the bond’s price to changes in the time to maturity compared
to changes in dependence. Similar results are obtained for the Catastrophe Event B.
Finally, we see that despite the increase in the thresholds and/or in the dependence
level, the price of a zero-coupon CAT bond stays at the level of 83.96 USD for T=3 and
79.21 USD for T=4 starting from the Case VI. This implies that when threshold levels
reach certain values, the probability of losing the principal becomes extremely low and it
is not affected by changes in the dependence. In such cases, the price of a zero-coupon
CAT bond stabilizes at the level of 1/(1 + r)T . We analyze the price stabilization issue
in more detail in Table 4 and Table 5. By varying the attachment level of catastrophe
losses and keeping the attachment level of deaths fixed, we find a level of catastrophe
losses at which CAT bond prices do not change. Table 4 presents CAT bond prices when
the attachment level of deaths is set to 48 people. Table 5 describes CAT bond prices
when this level is equal to 3000 people. In both cases, when the attachment level of
catastrophe losses reaches 25 bn USD, prices of coupon-paying CAT bonds become stable
and reach 104.78 USD and 108.02 USD respectively. Figure 17 shows graphically the
results of our computations. It is clear that for attachment levels of deaths that are in
the interval (48, 3000) the values of CAT bond prices would lie between the two lines in
Figure 16. In relation to prices of zero-coupon CAT bonds and for attachment mortality
level of 48 people, prices stabilize at the level of 83.96 USD when attachment level of
catastrophe losses is 17.8 bn. USD. However, for a higher attachment mortality level
of 3000 people the prices of zero-coupon CAT bonds stay at 83.96 USD independently
from the attachment level of property losses. These results are interesting to look at
from investors’ point of view. We observe that starting from a certain attachment level
of property losses that is much above the 99.9% quantile of their historical distribution,
investors have a choice to invest in multiple-event CAT bonds with different attachment
levels of property losses (keeping attachment point of deaths constant) and to pay the
same price. This phenomenon is due to extremely low probabilities of default of such
bonds. At the same time, investors’ choice is driven by their risk-return preferences and
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investors with more risk appetite most probably will not exploit this price stabilization
phenomenon. Instead, they may prefer to invest in cheaper multiple-event CAT bonds
with significantly higher default probabilities and higher returns.
3.5 Conclusions
This study is the first of its kind to develop a model for pricing of multiple-event coupon
paying CAT bonds covering exposure to catastrophic risks, including terrorism. The
pricing of the bond is implemented under the assumption of market incompleteness by
relying on the representative agent pricing model.
In contrast to the existing literature on pricing of standard CAT bonds, the pay-
offs on the bond in our model are linked to two types of underlying processes: insured
catastrophe property losses and catastrophe daily deaths. In addition, the bond under
consideration has a multiple-event and multiple-risk structure. We assume that both, the
bond’s coupons and its principal are at risk if the triggering events occur. This model
views catastrophic terrorism risk as one of the main catastrophic risks effecting the cash
flows of the bond.
An important contribution of this work is that it provides a numerical evaluation
of the price of the bond under consideration. We implement Monte Carlo simulations
of the bond price using the UK catastrophe data provided by Swiss Re. We consider
different catastrophe scenarios and compute corresponding prices of coupon-paying and
zero-coupon CAT bonds. These scenarios include events of the magnitude of the 9/11
attacks and higher as may be the case as a result of chemical, biological, radiological and
nuclear terrorist incidents.
The results of this study indicate that the price of the bond has a direct relationship
with threshold levels, but an inverse relationship with stronger positive dependence be-
tween losses and deaths. As to time to maturity, there is an inverse relationship between
the price of the bond and its time to expiration. Although this relationship always works
for a zero-coupon catastrophe bond, it may not always hold when a bond pays coupons.
In general, we find a less responsive behavior of the bond’s price to changes in dependence
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compared to changes in the time to maturity. In addition, we see that, for a coupon pay-
ing CAT bond, the impact of increase in attachment levels on the bond’s price dominates
the effect of extended maturity. The opposite result is observed for a zero-coupon CAT
bond.
The model suggested in this paper may be interesting to insurance and reinsurance
companies and other financial institutions. These organizations may want to consider us-
ing multiple-event CAT bonds to transfer to capital markets their exposure to catastrophic
risks, including terrorism risk. With respect to the latter risk, our model allows to pro-
tect from losses and deaths that are of significantly lower magnitude than what current
terrorism related risk transfer securities allow.
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Appendix A: Figures
Special Purpose Vechicle
(SPV)
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Figure 1. The CAT Bond Design. The figure shows a simple structure of a securitization
via the CAT bond.
Transaction
 Investors pay bond
proceeds
 Bond proceeds
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 Reinsurance coverage
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Before maturity
Coupon payments
 If one of the triggering
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then coupon payments
are terminated.
At maturity
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Figure 2. Timing of Cash Flows of the Multiple-Event CAT Bond.
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Figure 3. Catastrophe Deaths The figure shows daily number of catastrophe deaths in the
UK from January 1970 to January 2006.
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Figure 4. Catastrophe Insured Property Losses. The figure displays data on daily
catastrophe property losses in USD m. in the UK from January 1970 to January 2006.
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Figure 5. Sample Autocorrelation Function of (a) inter-arrival times; (b) log of inter-
arrival times; (c) square of log of inter-arrival times; (d) absolute value of log of inter-arrival
times. Ljung-Box Test for randomness at significance level α = 0.01: (a) rejected (L-J test
statistics is 47.72, p-value is zero); (b) accepted (L-J test statistics is 18.67, p-value is 0.23); (c)
accepted (L-J test statistics is 25.58, p-value is 0.04); (d) accepted (L-J test statistics is 18.67,
p-value is 0.23).
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Figure 6. Histogram of the Log of Inter-Arrival Times of Catastrophe Events.
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Figure 7. Histogram and Fitted Density of the Log of Inter-Arrival Times of
Catastrophe Events. A skewed Student’s t density with η̂ = 10.7176, λ̂ = −0.3380 is applied
to standardized data on log of inter-arrival times.
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Figure 8. QQ Plot of the Log of Inter-Arrival Times. Actual data versus simulated.
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Figure 9. QQ Plot of Inter-Arrival Times of Catastrophe Events. Actual data versus
simulated.
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Figure 10. Non-Zero Catastrophe Deaths. (a) Histogram; (b) Estimated (solid) and
Empirical (dotted) Cumulative Distribution Function.
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Figure 11. QQ Plot of Catastrophe Deaths. Actual data versus simulated.
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Figure 12. Log-transformed Non-Zero Catastrophe Losses. (a) Histogram; (b) Esti-
mated (solid) and Empirical (dotted) Cumulative Distribution Function.
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Figure 13. QQ Plot of Catastrophe Losses. Actual data versus simulated.
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Figure 14. A Scatter Plot of Catastrophe Property Losses and Deaths.
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Figure 15. Copula Fit. KN (v) empirical (dashed) versus KClayton(v) (solid) and KFrank(v)
(dotted)
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Figure 16. QQ-plot of Copula Fit. Empirical Copula versus (a) the Clayton and (b) the
Frank copulas.
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Figure 17. Price of the Coupon Paying CAT bond. Attachment level of deaths IDAP is
3000 (dash line) and 48 (solid line).
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Appendix B: Tables
Date Total Natural Catastrophes Man-Made Disasters Terrorism Events
1970 1 0 1 0
1971 3 0 3 0
1972 2 0 2 0
1973 3 0 3 0
1974 1 0 1 0
1975 3 0 3 0
1976 0 0 0 0
1977 1 0 1 0
1978 0 0 0 0
1979 0 0 0 0
1980 3 0 3 0
1981 3 1 2 0
1982 1 1 0 0
1983 2 0 2 0
1984 4 0 4 0
1985 2 0 2 0
1986 1 0 1 0
1987 5 1 4 0
1988 6 0 6 1
1989 4 0 4 0
1990 6 4 2 0
1991 4 1 3 0
1992 3 0 2 2
1993 8 2 6 1
1994 11 3 8 0
1995 2 1 1 0
1996 6 1 5 2
1997 8 3 5 0
1998 8 4 4 1
1999 6 0 6 1
2000 4 1 3 0
2001 5 0 5 0
2002 6 3 3 0
2003 1 0 1 0
2004 3 1 2 0
2005 11 3 9 1
Total 137 30 107 9
Source: Swiss Re
Table 1. Number of Catastrophe Events, 1970-2005
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Time to Maturity Dependence Threshold Level
Case I Case II Case III Case IV Case V Case VI Case VII
IDAP 48 48 48 48 48 211 211
LAP 1.36 1.36 1.36 1.36 1.36 4.34 4.34
Kendall’s τ -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 0.80 0.00 -0.16 -0.16
Principal, F 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Maturity, T 3 2 4 3 3 3 4
PB 98.57 99.92 95.84 97.07 97.94 107.03 108.90
PBZC 83.12 88.02 77.86 81.02 82.79 83.96 79.21
Table 2. Dynamics of the CAT Bond Price
LAP is given in billions USD, F is 100 USD. PB stands for a price of coupon-paying CAT bond and PBZC
for a price of a zero-coupon CAT bond. Prices are computed based on 1000 simulations.
Catastrophe Event A Catastrophe Event B
IDAP 3000 3000 3000 10000 10000 10000
LAP 35.60 35.60 35.60 150.00 150.00 150.00
Kendall’s τ -0.16 0.80 0.80 -0.16 0.80 0.80
Principal, F 100 100 100 100 100 100
Maturity, T 3 3 4 3 3 4
PB 108.02 108.02 110.40 108.02 108.02 110.48
PBZC 83.96 83.96 79.21 83.96 83.96 79.21
Table 3. High Magnitude Events
LAP is given in billions USD, F is 100 USD. PB stands for a price of coupon-paying CAT bond and PBZC
for a price of a zero-coupon CAT bond. Prices are computed based on 1000 simulations.
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IDAP 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
LAP 1.36 2.00 4.50 17.80 20.00 22.50 25.00 30.00 35.60 150.00
Kendall’s τ -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16
Principal, F 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Maturity, T 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
PB 98.57 101.34 104.01 104.77 104.77 104.77 104.78 104.78 104.78 104.78
PBZC 83.12 83.54 83.88 83.96 83.96 83.96 83.96 83.96 83.96 83.96
Table 4. Price of the CAT bond with Attachment Level of Deaths of 48 people
(80% quantile)
LAP is given in billions USD, F is 100 USD. PB stands for a price of coupon-paying CAT bond and PBZC
for a price of a zero-coupon CAT bond. Prices are computed based on 1000 simulations.
IDAP 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000
LAP 1.36 2.00 4.50 17.80 20.00 22.50 25.00 30.00 35.60 150.00
Kendall’s τ -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16
Principal, F 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Maturity, T 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
PB 101.66 104.35 107.14 107.99 107.99 108 108.02 108.02 108.02 108.02
PBZC 83.96 83.96 83.96 83.96 83.96 83.96 83.96 83.96 83.96 83.96
Table 5. Price of the CAT bond with Attachment Level of Deaths of 3000 people
(the 9/11 Attacks)
LAP is given in billions USD, F is 100 USD. PB stands for a price of coupon-paying CAT bond and PBZC
for a price of a zero-coupon CAT bond. Prices are computed based on 1000 simulations.
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Appendix C: One-Period Interest Rate
According to the representative agent model, viewed from time n, the price Pn(CF ) of a
generic future cash flow process CF = {CF (k) | k = n + 1, n + 2, . . . , T} is given by a
conditional expectation
Pn(CF ) = EP
[
T∑
k=n+1
u′k(C
∗(ω, k))
u′n(C∗(ω, n))
CF (k)|Pn
]
, (3.9)
where uk(C
∗(ω, k)) is the utility of the amount of the consumption good endowed to the
entire economy in state ω at time k.
Consider time k. If there is available a cash flow stream that pays a unit in one period
from now with certainty and nothing else, using equation (3.9), the implied interest rate
r(k) over the period is equal to
r(k) =
[
EP
[
u′k+1(C
∗(ω, k + 1))
u′k(C∗(ω, k))
|Pk
]]−1
− 1, (3.10)
leading to equation (3.2).
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Appendix D: Valuation Framework
The probability space for the full model is given as (Ω,P,P), where Ω := Ω(1)×Ω(2);
Pk = P
(1)
k ×P(2)k for k = 0, 1, . . . , T ; P(ω) = P1(ω(1))P2(ω(2)), where ω = (ω(1), ω(2))
is a generic state of the world describing the state of the financial market variables and
the catastrophic risk variables. The financial market variables are modelled on the fil-
tered probability space (Ω(1),P(1),P1). The catastrophic risk variables are modelled on
the filtered probability space (Ω(2),P(2),P2). In this setting, events that depend only
on economic risk variables and those that depend only on catastrophic risk variables are
independent.
To explain formula (3.5) in the section 4.2 we show main steps of the proof
developed in the paper by Cox and Pedersen (2000).
Authors define two new filtrations: A (1)k := P
(1)
k × {∅,Ω(2)} for k = 0, 1, . . . , T and
A (2)k := {∅,Ω(1)}×P(2)k for k = 0, 1, . . . , T . They prove that the two sigma-algebras A (1)T
and A (2)T are independent under the probability measure P:
P(α1 ∩ α2) = P(α1)P(α2),
where α1 ∈ A (1)T , α2 ∈ A (2)T and α1 = A1 × Ω(2) for some A1 ∈P(1)T and α2 = Ω(1) × A2
for some A2 ∈P(2)T .
A random variable X on (Ω,P,P) is said to depend only on financial risk variables
if it is measurable with respect to A (1)T . Alternatively, a random variable X is said to
depend only on catastrophic risk variables if it is measurable with respect to A (2)T .
A stochastic process Y is said to evolve through dependence only on financial risk
variables if Y is adapted to A (1). Alternatively, a stochastic process Y is said to evolve
through dependence only on catastrophic risk variables if Y is adapted to A (2).
In this setting and under the assumption that the aggregate consumption depends only
on the financial risk variables implies that C∗(ω(1), ω(2), k) is adapted to the filtration
A (1).
Lemma (p. 69-70, Cox and Pedersen (2000))
Under the assumption that aggregate consumption depends only on the financial risk
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variables, for any random variable X that depends only on catastrophic risk variables
EQ[X] = EP[X]. (3.11)
In particular, for any catastrophe event α ∈ A (2)T we have Q(α) = P(α) = P2(A),
where α ≡ Ω(1) × A for some set A ∈P(2)T .
Proof
We see from equation (3.4) that the Radon-Nikodym derivative depends only on fi-
nancial risk variables, that is dQ
dP |PT is A (1)T measurable. Therefore, the random variables
X and dQ
dP |PT are independent under P.
EQ[X] = EP[X
dQ
dP |PT ] = EP[X]EP
[
dQ
dP |PT
]
= EP[X] · 1 = EP[X].
Let X = 1α then
Q(α) = EQ[1α] = EP[1α] = P(α) = P(Ω(1) × A) = P1(Ω(1))P2(A) = 1 · P2(A) = P2(A).
2
Lemma (p. 70, Cox and Pedersen (2000))
Under the assumption that aggregate consumption depends only on the financial risk
variables, the sigma-algebras A (1)T and A
(2)
T are independent under Q.
Proof
Consider α1 ∈ A (1)T and α2 ∈ A (2)T . Q(α1 ∩ α2) = EO [1α11α2 ] = EP
[
1α11α2
dQ
dP |PT
]
.
Variables 1α1 , 1α2 and
dQ
dP |PT are independent under P and therefore
EP
[
1α11α2
dQ
dP |PT
]
= EP
[
1α1
dQ
dP |PT
]
E [1α2 ] = Q(α1)P(α2) = Q(α1)Q(α2). 2
This result brings us back to the statement in the section 4.2 namely that under the
valuation measure Q those events that depend only on financial risk variables are inde-
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pendent of those events that depend only on catastrophic risk variables.
If results of the above-mentioned lemmas are applied to formula (3.3) then the
result in formula (3.5) is obtained. Note that cash flows CF (k) on the bond are
assumed to depend only on the catastrophic risk valuables and that aggregate
consumption C∗(ω, k) is assumed to depend only on the financial risk variables.
To conclude, the main steps to arrive from formula (3.1) to (3.5) are the following
P0(CF ) =EP
[
T∑
k=1
u′k(C
∗(ω, k))
u′0(C∗(0))
CF (k)
]
= EQ
[
T∑
k=1
1
[1 + r(0)][1 + r(1)] . . . [1 + r(k − 1)]CF (k)
]
=
T∑
k=1
EQ
[
1
[1 + r(0)][1 + r(1)] . . . [1 + r(k − 1)]CF (k)
]
=
T∑
k=1
EQ
[
1
[1 + r(0)][1 + r(1)] . . . [1 + r(k − 1)]
]
EQ[CF (k)]
=
T∑
k=1
P (0, k)EQ[CF (k)] =
T∑
k=1
P (0, k)EP[CF (k)] =
T∑
k=1
P (0, k)EP2 [CF (k)].
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Appendix E: Multiple-Event CAT Bond Price
PB0 (CF ) =
∑
t∈{1,...,T}
CP (0, t)EP2 [Iτ3>t] + FP (0, T )EP2 [Iτ4>T ]
=
∑
t∈{1,...,T}
CP (0, t)P2[τ3 > t] + FP (0, T )P2[τ4 > T ]
=
∑
t∈{1,...,T}
CP (0, t)P2[min{τ1, τ2} > t] + FP (0, T )P2[max{τ1, τ2} > T ]
=
∑
t∈{1,...,T}
CP (0, t)P2[τ1 > t, τ2 > t] + FP (0, T )[1− P2(max(τ1, τ2) ≤ T )]
=
∑
t∈{1,...,T}
CP (0, t)P2[τ1 > t, τ2 > t] + FP (0, T )[1− P2(τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ T )− P2(τ2 ≤ τ1 ≤ T )]
=
∑
t∈{1,...,T}
CP (0, t)P2[IALt ≤ ILAPt , sup{0≤j≤t} I
D
j ≤ IDAP ] + FP (0, T )[1− P2(τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ T )− P2(τ2 ≤ τ1 ≤ T )]
=
∑
t∈{1,...,T}
CP (0, t)P2
[
t∑
i=0
ILi ≤ ILAPt , sup{0≤j≤t} I
D
j ≤ IDAP
]
+
FP (0, T )[1− P2(τ1 ≤ τ2 | τ2 ≤ T )P2(τ2 ≤ T )− P2(τ2 ≤ τ1 | τ1 ≤ T )P2(τ1 ≤ T )],
where P2 is a physical probability measure governing catastrophic events.
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Limitations and Possible Extensions
This thesis focuses on issues of risk management in relation to operational risk with a
specific emphasis on terrorism risk. The first paper of the thesis introduces the issue of
dependence between operational losses and how it can be accounted for in the value of
capital charge for operational risk. The analysis is implemented on the simulated data
sample since data on real operational losses are unavailable. The numerical evaluation
implemented in the paper would provide a more precise picture as to capital charge and
the dependence of operational losses if analysis was based on real operational loss data.
Prompted by Basel II, banks have only recently started gathering these data and, to
our knowledge, there is no publicly available source on operational losses. Calibration of
the simulated data is done by relying on the results of empirical studies that use some
industry data. However, these data usually cover only one year (reporting bias) and its
quality (data inconsistencies) and, therefore, reliability is not ideal. Currently and for the
near future, the lack and public inaccessibility of operational loss data is a major obstacle
to study and to develop analytical approaches for operational risk. A possible extension
of this paper would be to use the suggested methodology when more classes of risk are
included in CaR computations22.
The second paper of the thesis is an empirical study of the impact of a particular type
of operational risk event, namely, terrorist attacks, on the behavior of stock, bond and
commodity markets. Further research on the impact of terrorist events in the framework
of suggested methodologies can be extended to some countries in the islamic world as well
as to such countries as India and Israel. In addition, a diversification effect can be further
investigated by looking at different portfolios of stocks, bonds and commodities.
22We implement numerical evaluation of the CaR when operational losses of two classes of risk are considered.
According to the regulatory framework, operational losses of a bank are grouped in 56 classes.
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Finally, the third paper suggests a model for pricing of a multiple-event coupon paying
CAT bond. The bond that we consider covers exposure to catastrophic risk such as natural
and man-made disasters, including terrorist events. Pricing of the bond is done in the
incomplete market setting, however, under simplifying assumption of independence of
events that are driven by only economic risk variables and those that depend only on
catastrophic risk variables. In the real world, catastrophic events may lead to economic
events. For example, the 9/11 attacks resulted in both catastrophic property losses and
reduction by the Federal Reserve of interest rates. Here, the price of the bond would be
affected by both the catastrophic element and economic element. Therefore, a natural
extension of the current paper would be to develop a pricing framework when the above-
mentioned assumption of independence is relaxed, i.e the assumption of dependence is
introduced. Another possible extension of the work may lie in the area of modelling of
pricing of the bond based on the catastrophic data for countries other than the UK.
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Summary and Final Remarks
Increasing magnitude of operational losses over the last decade and their negative effect on
financial industry have necessitated increasing attention to operational risk. This thesis
covers such issues as loss dependence and quantification of operational risk exposure and
empirical analysis of the impact of terrorist attacks on the behavior of financial markets.
Finally, we propose a model for pricing of a multiple-event coupon paying CAT bond.
This bond covers exposure to catastrophic risks such as natural and man-made disasters,
including terrorist attacks.
Research on operational risk both by academics and practitioners is currently growing
with a particular focus on quantitative methodologies and their implementation. In rela-
tion to terrorism risk and, in particular, the effect of this risk on financial markets, most of
the research is of descriptive nature and focuses on the impact of very few terrorist events
(often only those which occurred on September 11, 2001). Finally, existing literature on
pricing of CAT bonds focuses mostly on models for standard CAT bonds that do not have
a multiple-event structure and do not cover exposure to terrorism risk.
Our work consists of three papers contributes to existing research in several ways.
The first paper addresses the issue of dependence between operational losses and how
it can be accounted for in the value of capital at risk associated with operational risk.
In contrast to the Loss Distribution Approach described by regulators in Basel II, this
model accounts for the underlying dependence between aggregate losses of different classes
of risk. Advancing previous research, the measurement of the above mentioned depen-
dence accounts for both, dependence between loss frequencies and dependence between
loss severities. By accounting for these two sources of dependence, our approach helps
to decrease inaccuracy in the measurement of bank’s exposure to operational risk. In
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addition, we demonstrate results of the numerical evaluation when instead of the VaR, a
coherent and more conservative risk measure is used to compute a capital charge, namely
the expected shortfall.
The second paper is empirical and one of the very few that study the link between
terrorism and behavior of stock, bond and commodity markets. In contrast to impact
studies that often employ only event-study methodology, in our paper we investigate the
impact of terrorism using other methods as well. These are non-parametric methodology
and a filtered GARCH with the Extreme Value Theory approach. Both methods are
standard econometric tools. However, the way we apply them in this work is original.
The results of empirical analysis suggest several diversification strategies for investors
who may be concerned about possible adverse effects of terrorism risk on their portfolios.
When dealing with terrorism risk, investors should consider holding two groups of assets:
those that are likely to react positively to terrorist attacks or those that have little or
no negative sensitivity to this risk. In the first case, a U.S. Government bond index is
the safest choice followed by such industry stocks as aero/defense and pharma/biotech.
However, given that these stock markets may also exhibit a negative response, investing in
these industries as a diversification strategy against terrorist attacks may not always work.
In the second case, banking stock index may be good for investment. Note that, though
this stock index is least sensitive to terrorist attacks, it exhibits significant negative return
movements associated with financial crashes. In relation to terrorist attacks, investing in
a composite commodity index is preferable to investing in gold only. in addition, another
possible way to reduce negative exposure to terrorist events would be to avoid investing in
insurance, travel and airline industry stocks. Finally, the response of financial markets to
terrorist events suggests several strategies of trading derivatives. For example, investors
can hold long positions in put options on the industry stocks that may react negatively
to terrorist events (for example, airline and insurance industry stocks). Or, alternatively,
they can invest in call options, where the underlying asset is a U.S. Government bond
index.
The third paper is the first of its kind to develop a model for pricing of multiple-event
coupon paying CAT bonds covering exposure to catastrophic risks, including terrorism
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risk. The pricing of the bond is implemented under the assumption of market incom-
pleteness by relying on the representative agent pricing model. In contrast to the existing
literature on pricing of standard CAT bonds, the payoffs on the bond in our model are
linked to two types of underlying processes: catastrophic property losses and catastrophic
mortality. Along with natural catastrophes and man-made disasters, our model views ter-
rorism risk as one of the main exposure risks that may affect the cash flows of the bond.
An important contribution of the third paper is that it provides a numerical evaluation
of the price of the bond under consideration. We implement a Monte Carlo simulation
of the price using the UK catastrophe data provided by Swiss Re. We consider differ-
ent cases/scenarious for which we compute corresponding prices of coupon-bearing and
zero-coupon CAT bonds.
The results of the third paper indicate that the price of the bond increases with
threshold levels and decreases with stronger positive dependence between property losses
and deaths. With respect to time to maturity, there is an inverse relationship between
the price of the bond and its time to expiration. Although this relationship always works
for a zero-coupon catastrophe bond, it may not always hold when the bond pays coupons.
We find the bond’s price to be less responsive to changes in dependence between property
losses and deaths than to changes in the bond’s time to maturity. We see that for a
coupon paying CAT bond the impact of increasing attachment levels on the bond’s price
dominates the effect of longer maturity periods. The opposite relationship is observed
for a zero-coupon CAT bond. The model suggested in this paper may be interesting to
insurance and reinsurance companies and other financial institutions. These organizations
may want to consider using multiple-event CAT bonds to transfer to capital markets their
exposure to catastrophic risks, including terrorism risk.
In summary, in this thesis we look at different aspects of operational risk management
with a special emphasis on terrorism risk. As evidenced by the 9/11 attacks, terrorism risk
can be catastrophic and can have a severe negative economic impact on financial industry.
Quantification and management of terrorism risk represents an area of opportunity for
further academic research. However, the high level of uncertainty surrounding terrorism
risk makes this a very challenging task.
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